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9 
God is against empire, obviously. Or is it so obvious? Throughout the 
ages Eastern and Western Christians have lived comfortably within 
empires. Regularly, we have even legitimated, constructed, and ruled 
Christian empires. Eusebius of Caesarea (c. AD 260-340) made the 
classic Christian argument, largely persuasive in that epoch. First, the 
biblical God had personally and precisely directed history to 
culminate in the Roman Empire. Second, God had personally raised 
up Constantine and precisely equipped him to be the emperor capable 
of making the Roman empire godly, indeed, Christian. ' So, given the 
long history of Christian arguments, which adopted and adapted 
Eusebius's basic case, why does it appear so obvious to many 
Christians today that the biblical God is against empire? Ironically, 
we unwittingly promote empire to the extent that we simply assume 
that God is self-evidently against empire. Call this assumption 
"routinized empire ungodliness." 
Those today who intend empire and who aspire to invent a US 
empire count on routinized empire ungodliness. In fact, the United 
States is a classic instance of routinized empire ungodliness. We are 
a country born by a revolution against imperial power because God is 
against empire. We have engraved this in our most sacred document, 
The Declaration of Independence. Tragically, however, routinized 
empire ungodliness helps to cloak an emerging implicit imperialism. 
Implicit imperialism looms just beneath the surface of US 
routinized empire ungodliness. Actually US public life seems more 
like an amorphous muddle of implicit imperialism and routinized 
empire ungodliness. But it could get worse! The inventors of implicit 
imperialism will - when the time is right (say, for example, after a 
horrific terrorist attack of staggering proportions beyond even the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 [hereafter 9/11]) - uncover 
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and unleash a full term, full spectrum, explicit empire. The world's 
only hopeF 
Now again is the time to make an explicit public case that God is 
against empire and how God is against empire. This case will help us 
to see through the implicit imperialism already being prototyped right 
under our noses. Since the Soviet Union and its empire collapsed in 
1989, the US has taken on the self-consciousness of "the only 
remaining superpower." Neo-con internationalists have used the 9/1 1 
atrocity to stimulate an erotic of imperial power. Finally, we must 
root a persuasive critique of empire in what the biblical God is "for" 
in the international sphere. 
Our inquiry will take seven turns. First, I will explore the nature of 
the assertion, "God is against empire." Second, I will outline the 
historic modem forms of empire and the classic rationales for empire as 
a backdrop for perceiving "implicit imperialism." Third, I will pose the 
question of implicit imperialism in the context of an emerging and 
ascending neo-con internationalism. Fourth, I will examine "the Bush 
doctrine" as the public face of implicit imperialism. Fifth, I will analyze 
the 2003-2004 Iraq War within the context of implicit imperialism. 
Sixth, I will explore how the biblical God is accomplishing epoch-
making good through the emergence of civil society and deliberative 
democracy. Finally, I will suggest that by honouring God in the 
emerging global civil society we are critical patticipants in God's 
preferential option for an international rule of just law. 
1. The Nature of the Assertion, "God Is against Empire" 
Biblically speaking, empire is neither commanded nor forbidden. The 
ancient Stoics provided the category for such phenomena: adiaphora 
or, as the Latin scholars translated it, "indifferent things." Throughout 
the centuries Christians have appropriated this Stoic category, 
sometimes uncritically and thus detrimentally, and at other times 
more critically and thus fruitfully. An example of the former is when 
Christians appropriated the Stoic claim that passions and emotions 
per se are indifferent, merely bodily externals that make no positive 
contribution to the moral life and, indeed in the view of some 
Christians, even mortally imperil the moral life. A critical and fruitful 
appropriation happened when, during the Reformation era 
adiaphorist controversy, Lutheranism's Formula of Concord deemed 
that under certain circumstances even adiaphora, things neither 
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commanded nor forbidden by God, could be an occasion for tempus 
confessionis, a time for confessing.' The so-called Second 
Adiaphorist Controversy of the seventeenth century pertains to our 
situation regarding empire because it involved Christian theological 
assessments of public life.~ 
Christian public theology and ethics addresses things both 
biblically commanded and forbidden by God as well as things neither 
biblically commanded nor forbidden by God, that is, adiaphora. An 
example of something commanded by God, which public theology 
and ethics addresses, is divinely instituted political authority. An 
example of something forbidden by God, which public theology and 
ethics addresses, is holy war and crusade executed under the sign of 
the cross.s An inquiry regarding empire entails public theology and 
ethics addressing an adiaphoron. 
"Now wait a minute!" perhaps you are thinking, or even 
shouting. "Empire cannot be an adiaphoron because it is so weighty. 
Are not adiaphora 'indifferent' things and therefore unimportant?" 
Lutherans usually remember clearly that polity, especially church 
polity, is a matter of adiaphora. That is, neither churchly nor worldly 
polity is scripturally laid down in stone for all times and places. From 
this conviction, however, we have drawn the false conclusion that 
adiaphora are theologically unimportant, uninteresting, even neutral. 
Calling adiaphora "indifferent" things lulls us towards this 
supposition. But that supposition goes against the intention of this 
Lutheran teaching. 
Our Lutheran memory needs sharpening in three ways. First, 
polity matters! Without doubt, both churchly and temporal polity 
matter. They matter to the world because they matter to the biblical 
God who created this world to flourish and continually creates it so. 
Second, because neither churchly nor worldly polity is scripturally 
laid down in stone for all times and places, therefore both entail the 
historical variability of God's continuing creativity. Finally, because 
churchly and temporal polities are adiaphora, thereby debatable 
variables of God's continuing creativity, we ought, of course, 
therefore, to deliberate them. We ought to deliberate them, 
vigorously, for each time and place with all the theological and 
ethical resources and skills that we can bring to the task. Such 
theological and ethical deliberation is the very prototype of a 
theological-ethical task.6 
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We study empire in the concrete and this brings a difficulty. Our 
inquiry meets partisan politics. In the 2000 US presidential election 
the electorate was evenly divided. A January 2004 Gallup 
Organization study revealed that Republicans and Democrats were 
evenly divided, each holding 45% of the popular vote. In one way the 
divide in 2004 looks a lot like the 2000 presidential divide. In another 
way the divide is different. Since 9/11 and the 2003-04 Iraq War, 
issues that often internally divide Democrats have moved to the 
foreground, while issues that often internally divide Republics have 
moved to the background. The form of the United States' 
international spirit is such an issue. 
A caveat is therefore prudent. There is a risk in the way that I 
make my case, especially because I situate the Iraq War and "the 
Bush doctrine" squarely within the context of imperialism. To many 
that seems, well, just plain extreme, conspiratorial, or even 
unpatriotic. Take for example, the reprimand by David Horowitz, a 
well-known convert to neo-conservatism from left liberalism. 
And while it may be perfectly reasonable to argue 
about the justification to go to war, calling the 
president a deceiver and accusing him of sacrificing 
Americans for no particular cause is not a reasonable 
argument. It is a stab in the back of the commander in 
chief and the nation whose security he is defending. 
And not only in respect to the president but to all 
Americans, especially the troops in harms way.7 
To guard the nation against back-stabbing traitors is a rational 
suspicion. I, myself, have this suspicion though the "back-stab" 
rhetoric tends toward repression. Surely, in a nation "of the people, 
by the people, for the people" everyone bears the calling of vigilance. 
To safeguard the President and the Presidency is normative 
patriotism. A nation of, by, and for the people, however, dare never 
confuse critical vigilance with quiet compliance.~ Doth Horowitz 
commend compliance? 
Generally, critics of the President do not rebuke him for 
executing the War "for no particular cause." That certainly is not my 
objection. Quite the contrary! The President, under neo-con 
influence, has a "particular cause," implicit imperialism. To explicate 
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that cause is one important task; another is to expose deception and 
its historic rationale and purpose. 
2. Empire and Implicit Imperialism 
In his January 20, 2004 State of the Union Address President George 
W. Bush sought to reassure the United States, an assurance heard 
around the world: "America is a nation with a mission, and that 
mission comes from our most basic beliefs. We have no desire to 
dominate, no ambitions of empire."9 That the president had to tender 
this assurance itself indicates that real "empire" merits investigation. 
Four days later in Davos, Switzerland, Vice President Dick Cheney 
sought again to disavow any US ambition to empire. "If we were to 
empire, we would currently preside over a much greater piece of the 
Earth's surface than we do. That's not the way we operate."10 Of 
course, the 2003-2004 Iraq War precipitates these executive 
disavowals. The Vice President's definition of empire as one nation-
state politically presiding over other nation-states' territories obliges 
us to examine the different forms of empire less we miss the factual 
form before us and how the Iraq War reveals implicit imperialism. 
Empire always carries both internal and external dimensions. 
Implicit imperialism does likewise. I concentrate on external 
international dynamics, but this does not imply that internal domestic 
dynamics are less significant. International and domestic dynamics 
remain linked. For instance, domestic systemic deception facilitates 
the execution of imperial internationalism. Indeed, systemic 
deception is a tell-tale mark. 
One recognized definition of empire states: "the policy of a state 
aiming to establish control beyond its borders over people unwilling 
to accept such control." 11 The word "control" is a strong word and 
may seem on a first read to imply the control of territory by means of 
military force or by an imposed law backed by force. Of course, it can 
mean that and, as we will see, that is one classic form of empire; but 
it is not the only form. Since the fifteenth century there have been 
three broad periods of empire. The first period runs roughly from the 
fifteen through the eighteenth centuries. The empires built by 
England, France, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain, and often in 
competition with each other, colonized the Americas, India, and the 
East Indies. Spain and Portugal geographically partitioned the non-
Christian world by drawing a line through the Atlantic Ocean. Each 
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could claim and occupy territory on their agreed upon side of the line. 
Portugal agreed to stay east of the line and Spain to stay west ofthe 
line. While Portugal's territory made for barely an empire, Spain 
colonized a great swath of the Americas. Spain's overseas territories 
became and remained the King's private estate. 
The second period runs from the nineteenth century until World 
War I. Russian, Italy, Japan, and the United States all, to some extent, 
entered the empire picture. Legalized ownership backed by military 
force receded into the background as the defining form of empire. 
Indirect, especially financial, control became the preferred form of 
imperialism. The birth of the League ofNations at the close ofWorld 
War I kept this form of imperialism in check for barely a decade. 
The third period runs from 1930 through the 1980s. Imperial 
Japan, fascist Italy, nationalist-socialist Germany, and communist 
Russia invented empire in an aggressive totalitarian form that 
incorporated elements of both previous forms. Vice President Cheney 
rejects only the form of empire characterized by "legalized," 
territorial ownership and backed by military force, which dominated 
the first period of empire and which was revived in totalitarian mode 
in the third period. History teaches that the economic costs of that 
form are high and unsustainable for the seat of empire. Further, it 
teaches that the burden of misery where the boot of control meets the 
seized territory is not humanly tolerable for long. Neo-cons know 
this. They also know that "legalized" territorial seizure is not the only 
historic form. 
We can see how different forms by reviewing the four classic 
justifications for the modem forms of empire. The first justification 
draws on an economic rationale. Simply put, an efficient empire 
provides economic benefits for all. Classical liberals like Adam Smith 
(181h century) and David Ricardo (early 19'h century) rejected the 
economic argument for empire. They noted that a few elites do benefit 
greatly, but the nation as a whole and the empire as a whole does not 
proportionately. Ironically, Smith had inspired the more economically 
focused form of empire because he had argued that territory was not 
the sole source of imperial wealth and that labor was an increasing 
source of wealth. Classical Marxists like Vladimir Lenin (20'" century) 
and Nikolai Bukharin (20'h century) also rejected the economic 
argument in its particularly capitalist form. They viewed capitalism 
and imperialism as identical in capitalism's late stage. National 
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capitalist economies become monopolistic and are forced to conquer 
foreign outlets to accommodate their overproduction and foreign 
sources to acquire cheaper raw materials and labor. 
A second modern justification for empire draws on a human 
nature rationale. In brief, human beings engage in a natural struggle 
for survival and for dominance. Niccolo Machiavelli (16'h century), 
Francis Bacon (17'h century), Thomas Hobbes (17'h century), Herbert 
Spencer (19'h century), Ludwig Gumplowicz (19'h century), Adolf 
Hitler (20'h century), and Benito Mussolini (20'h century) among 
others typify this argument. The overwhelmingly powerful will 
ruthlessly rule over the masses - masses who otherwise would only 
engage in a perpetual war of all against all. Classic political 
liberalism has rejected this view and offered the equal rights tradition 
in its place. 
A third modern justification for empire draws on national 
security and strategic arguments. This rationale for empire aims to 
establish and maintain buffer states equipped with military bases, and 
to control communication and strategic command of military 
resources. The seat of empire uses vassal buffer states as satellites. 
These satellite nations receive both security and economic assistance, 
not much different from the ancient practice of a mercenary army. 
This has been the dominant post-World War II imperial rationaleY 
A fourth modern justification for empire feeds off a moral 
rationale, at times harmonized with a religiously missionary tenor. 
This is the classic noblesse oblige of a permanent aristocracy now 
practiced on an international stage. '3 Those of high birth, social 
standing, economic wealth, and political-military power carry special 
obligations of generosity to care for those of lesser birth, standing, 
wealth, and power for the latter's own good. The seat of empire 
armed with this moral rationale stresses the sacrifices it makes for the 
betterment of those ruled and the resolve that it takes on the part of 
the empire to be so sacrificially beneficent. After all we aristocrats 
"wouldn't have to" and "it's for their own good." 
People typically assume that ancient Rome justified the pax 
Romana according to a human nature rationale akin to the second one 
above. There is an element of truth in that assumption. But the human 
nature argument requires a ubiquitous, overwhelming military force. 
Roman moralists offered a more effective strategy based upon an 
aristocratic moral vision. Aristocrats resolutely practiced their 
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honour-shame culture on a daily basis throughout the Empire. This 
comprehensive set of practices maintained the Empire more 
effectively and in a way that no standing army could possible do 
because of the expensive. 
When the honour-shame society frayed, which constantly 
happened, the Empire would send in the cavalry to apply force and to 
mend the tear in the honour-shame cloth. When the cavalry met a 
full-scale revolt, the Empire would deploy the overwhelming power 
of its standing anny until the cavalry could handle it again and 
eventually hand back the honour-shame cloth to the aristocracy. The 
pax Romana relied upon critical intelligence, preemptive force, 
precision strikes, and military mobility. '4 
These four rationales are not mutually exclusive. Historically 
imperialists have combined them. Sometimes hegemonic theorists use 
one rationale to reinforce another; at other times an imperialist will 
publicly hail one rationale in order to provide cover for the true 
justification of empire. In the latter situation imperial advocates 
publicly air and aim a certain rationale to convince a broad public with 
common needs and concerns. The tacit rationale, inaudible to the 
general public, serves the interests of a few who are spoken to quietly 
though clearly. For instance, an imperial herald might publicly 
proclaim a national security rationale for empire that masks a tacit, 
crony capitalist, economic rationale primarily benefiting the elite. 
This is the classic setting of ideology. Historically, those with 
imperial ambition use arguments that draw from the natural right to 
safety in the third historic rationale or from the natural obligation to 
beneficence in the fourth historic rationale in order to cloak the first 
two historic rationales, which appear to many to be little more than 
slavery or tyranny. These public cloaking strategies divulge 
systematically distorted communication. Moreover, systemic 
deception funds the implicitness of implicit imperialism. Finally, 
systemic deception is the feedback loop between the international and 
domestic sides of implicit imperialism. '5 
Nearly fifty years ago Reinhold Niebuhr said, "The final question 
is where the empire of the American super-state fits into this 
gradation of value [the costs and benefits both intended and collateral 
of the various forms of empire]; and where the empire which is so 
desperately anxious not to be an empire stands."16 At the close of the 
1950s Niebuhr argued that balancing the two great empires was the 
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only real way forward. To make this argument he had to confess 
empire. Today's neo-cons refuse to make that confession publicly, a 
refusal they consider to be wise. We must engage neo-con 
internationalists because they frame both President Bush's disavowal 
of empire and "the Bush doctrine" that executes implicit imperialism. 
3. Neo-con Internationalism as Implicit Imperialism 
Neo-con theorists aim to sculpt the future by controlling the form of 
US internationalism. Paul Wolfowitz notes, "In a world where 
American primacy seems so overwhelming ... [t]he ultimate test of 
foreign policy is how successfully it shapes the future." 17 Neo-cons 
assert that during the last quarter century "the world [has] indeed 
been transformed in America's image. " 18 They seek to strengthen and 
extend that benevolent transformation, "above all, preserving and 
reinforcing America's benevolent global hegemony" (6). This 
discourse of"benevolent global hegemony" cotTesponds to the moral 
rationale for empire. Neo-con internationalists refuse- wisely as they 
see it - to use the word "empire." Despite this refusal they sponsor 
and speak "empire" nevertheless. Call it, "implicit imperialism." 
How is this so? 
Neo-con internationalists denounce "a return to normal times" 
and decry the US ever becoming again "a normal nation" (9-12). 
Instead, they compare US power and prestige to that exercised when 
"Rome dominated the Mediterranean world" (6). They do not 
envision America being a mere "saviour of last resort" for world 
peace or a "reluctant sheriff' enforcing justice (15-16). Such callings 
betray a weak and wimpy America. George Will, the influential neo-
con journalist, thinks this wimpy leadership is due to "the 
feminization" of leadership, of politics, and of internationalism. Will 
desires "manly" leadership, "the modern prince," re-
masculinization. 19 
Neo-con theorists announce the new calling, the preferred future. 
The "United States would instead conceive of itself as at once a 
European power, an Asian power, a Middle Eastern power and, of 
course, a Western Hemisphere power" ( 15-16). Above all, neo-cons 
pursue a "unipolar era" (6). "A multipolar world ... would be far 
more dangerous" than the unipolar world of US "benevolent global 
hegemony."~0 Later, we will follow up on the clue given by George 
Will regarding "the prince." 
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The 1990s saw little difference between Democrats and 
Republicans, between liberals and conservatives, say the neo-cons. 
Everyone confessed and practiced either wimpy "liberal 
internationalism" (by and large Democrats) or international 
"isolationism" (by and large Republicans), or a Cold War realism 
with a missing rival (both Democrats and Republicans). During the 
mid to late 1990s the neo-cons strategized to transform the 
Republican Party by denouncing isolationism. This denunciation 
bore abundant fruit only after 9/ 11. 
During the 1990s neo-cons internationalists enunciated pre-
emptive "regime change" "as a central component" of its doctrine.11 
Neo-cons "regard military force as an instrument of foreign policy to 
be called upon when necessary to achieve our goals. A bit more 
abstractly, but no less importantly, [neo-con] internationalists find 
worth and dignity in the nation committing itself to this kind of 
enterprise .... " Theodore Roosevelt set the precedent at the dawn of 
the twentieth century. Theodore Rex, after all, privileged "warlike 
intervention by the civilized powers [which] would contribute 
directly to the peace ofthe world." 
Neo-con internationalists claim that "America's benevolent 
global hegemony" comports and conducts itself by blending 
universal moral principle with US national interest. The principles 
cited are democracy and free-market capitalism. Many find it difficult 
to object to neo-con rhetoric because of the abstract manner in which 
they time and again intone these principles. In fact, they stay on 
message so monotonously and vacuously that you might even 
imagine them hiring a Madison Avenue marketing firm to write this 
part of their script. Publicly they intone these principles as abstractly 
as possible. Among themselves they hold a specific, concrete form of 
democracy, an aristocratic form of democracy, which we will 
investigate in part six below.11 
The neo-con notion of "statesmanship" betrays their aristocratic 
ethos. Neo-cons note that the move from principles to the application of 
principles means taking contingent circumstances into consideration. 
This move to application, say the neo-cons, distinguishes them from 
idealists, who also claim to be principled. Neo-cons are adamant in this. 
Applying principles means always weighing competing interests and 
objectives. Neo-con "statesmanship" consists of"melding the necessities 
of the moment with our strategic objectives and moral ideals."13 
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Well, so far so good. Neo-con statesmanship partakes of a classic 
difference between Plato and Aristotle. Plato, the idealist, would have 
the philosopher-king, angelically from above, employing his pure 
reason (nous) to rule disinterestedly (and thereby in self-delusion by 
Aristotle's judgment). Aristotle, the principled pragmatist, would 
have the statesman, fully embodied in the contingencies and 
ambiguities of this world, employing his practical wisdom 
(phronesis) to rule the mix of interests and situations before him. If 
this were the forced choice I would recommend Aristotle's path. In 
part six below, we will see how civil society significantly revisions 
"practical reason," which signals a critical departure from an 
aristocratic ethos toward a deliberative ethos. 
At this point, however, neo-con internationalists self-
consciously take the troubling turn that constitutes the imperialist 
impulse itself, and that legitimates the systemic deception at the 
heart of implicit imperialism. Paul Wolfowitz immediately follows 
up the statecraft "melding" of circumstantial necessity, strategy, and 
moral ideal with this conclusion: "Thus, foreign policy decisions 
cannot be subject to the kind of 'rule of law' that we want for our 
domestic political process."14 Note the cleavage! The neo-con future 
privileges an enduring aristocratic internationalism! Four great 
millstones fasten around this conclusion and plunge it into the 
swirling sea of empire. 
In the neo-con moral world the United States should aspire -
aspire! - to live autonomously from the rule of law. The first 
millstone! Neo-con internationalists desire the US to be "the man" of 
the world. "Who, then, will rule the ruler?" This is an ancient Western 
inquiry, asked classically by Plutarch and debated throughout the 
Middle Ages and Renaissance.15 The US settled the question for itself 
at its founding. We are a nation "of laws, and not ofmen."16 Will neo-
cons overturn this birthright of the United States of America? 
Plutarch reasoned that "law" was embodied in the person of the 
ruler, and, as we mentioned at the outset, Eusebius of Caesarea gave 
Plutarch's reasoning a Christian theological spin. Neo-con 
internationalists have decided resolutely in Plutarch's favorY Law is 
embodied in the corporate person of the US empire and its President. 
This will be the burning international question for the foreseeable 
future, and it will be the context for our inquiry into global civil 
society. 
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The neo-con antinomian aspiration surely contradicts the stated 
aspirations of the US. The US has not, however, always conducted 
itself accordingly. At times our national conduct has unintentionally 
yet certainly failed to follow rule of law; at other times our intentions 
have been more hypocritical. Still, even hypocritical conduct proves 
the old maxim: hypocrisy is the compliment that vice pays to virtue. 
But neo-cons reject the virtue itself, the rule of law. A definitive 
indicator of empire! 
A second rope, fastened to the millstone of international 
antinomianism, fixes a second millstone: "The downside is that this 
[rejection of the rule of law] can cause difficulties in securing public 
understanding; it often seems too much like 'trimming' or 
insincerity."28 Now, there is an understatement! The downside- more 
like the depths of the sea - is that the rejection of law eviscerates 
public trust by undercutting the publics' vocation to hold political 
authority accountable both domestically and internationally. The 
second millstone! 
Neo-cons do not think highly of the US publics' capacities for 
public understanding and judgment. US publics lack the requisite 
"perspective" and "steadfast manner." Indeed, neo-cons see public 
understanding as "an obstacle to statesmanship," more so in the 
international arena. As Wolfowitz is quick, and right, to point out, 
"observers of democracy" for the last two hundred years have 
criticized democratic publics in this way.29 Actually, that so-called 
observation is a value laden, politically inspired criticism of the 
democratic thrust. That critique of democracy has existed for over 
two thousand years. It springs from aristocratic superciliousness, 
which has always judged the hoi polloi incapable of public 
understanding and thus of self-rule embodied in the rule of law. 
A third millstone shows itself immediately as neo-cons bemoan 
the hardships of statesmanship: "The widely-recognized 'CNN 
effect,' the fact that foreign pol icy decisions must now be made in the 
glare of intensive and instantaneous publicity, certainly makes 
statesmanship harder."30 Oh, for the days of imperial opacity! For the 
days of smoke-filled rooms where only "the manly," who see clearly 
and carry no doubts, decide policy! This bemoaning, while it may 
sound like only the personal whining of individual neo-cons and thus 
merely a character weakness, entails in fact a well-considered, 
comprehensive political philosophy that funds implicit imperialism. 
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Here we find the seed of intentional - note, not unintentional! -
systemic deception, the third millstone.31 The people's public 
incompetence requires the practice of systemic deception for the sake 
of global order. There is a moral tone here. The third millstone: 
systemic deception as public moral virtue! Can this be possible? 
Neo-cons discipline themselves not to let publics get in the way 
of their superior understanding and will. Neo-cons justifY systemic 
under the category, "linguistic problems."'2 Use language that will not 
offend the sensibilities of the US and world publics, they say. Do not 
use words like "imperium" or "hegemon" because they "carry strong 
connotations of dominion and empire." Such words, true in 
themselves as they concede, "give offense" to publics who do not 
understand their scientific, "purely descriptive" use. After all, the 
embryonic empire ofneo-con internationalism aspires "not directly to 
rule others," the decisive word being "directly." This routine 
disavowal merely masks again the other historic fonns of and 
rationales for empire. 
Neo-cons learned the discipline to deal with "linguistic 
problems" from personal experience. In 1992 Pentagon staffers of 
Paul Wolfowitz penned the now-famous Pentagon draft of a grand 
new strategy designed to preserve unipolarity by preventing the 
emergence of any global rival. The draft talked about American 
"primacy and predominance" and "maintain[ing] mechanisms for 
deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional 
or global scale."31 Criticism came swiftly and harshly. Neo-con 
linguistic discipline emerged. From here on out, expunge "indiscreet 
language"! Use the discourse of "leader" or "indispensable nation," 
which was Bill Clinton's during the 1990s; saturate it, however, with 
doctrines advanced by "hegemonic theory."14 
Neo-cons take the "systemic deception" page for their treatise on 
implicit imperialism right from an all-star chapter in Western political 
thought: chapter eighteen of Machiavelli's The Prince. 
Every one admits how praiseworthy it is in a prince 
to keep faith, and to live with integrity and not with 
craft. Nevertheless our experience has been that 
those princes who have done great things have held 
good faith of little account, and have known how to 
circumvent the intellect of men by craft, and in the 
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end have overcome those who have relied on their 
word ... and he who has known best how to employ 
the fox has succeeded best. 
But it is necessary to know well how to disguise this 
characteristic, and to be a great pretender and 
dissembler; and men are so simple, and so subject to 
present necessities, that he who seeks to deceive will 
always find someone who will allow himself to be 
deceived.35 
Machiavelli models the effective ruler after Achilles of old, who 
is "given to Centaur Chiron to nurse," Chiron the "half beast and half 
man." In fact, two beasts make up the beast half: the lion and the fox. 
The lion provides the overwhelming power and the fox provides the 
"morally" necessary deceit and secrecy. 
Unsurprisingly, neo-cons do not directly credit Machiavelli, not 
usually. Far too foxy are they. Truly, "so much notoriety has gathered 
around Machiavelli's name that the charge of being a Machiavellian 
still remains a serious accusation in political debate."36 While reading 
the neo-cons; the following observation rings as true today as it did 
more than half a century ago: 
Therein lies the importance of The Prince in the 
subsequent history of the Western world. 
Machiavelli wrote a grammar of power, not only for 
the sixteenth century, but for the ages that have 
followed. Read The Prince today and you will be 
struck by the denotations which its sentences set off 
in the corridors of our experiences with present-day 
rulers .... 37 
Standard historical accounts depict Machiavelli's justification for 
overwhelming and, when necessary, ruthless power as amoral. 
The Prince has become, for better or worse, a symbol 
of a whole body of literature and a whole approach 
to politics. Just as in literature and art we must 
always face, under whatever names, the polar 
http://scholars.wlu.ca/consensus/vol29/iss2/2
God Against Empire 23 
conflict of classic and romantic, so in the history of 
political thinking we have always faced the polar 
conflict between the ethical and the ruthlessly 
realistic. 18 
This depiction is not exactly correct. On the one hand, it is true; 
Machiavelli did intend merely a "factual, realist" account of the 
effectiveness and efficiency of overwhelming power. On the other 
hand, he intended this "factual, realist" account to be nothing less than 
a new kind of moral argument superior to Aristotle's. Machiavelli 
thought that aristocracy was too burdened and bogged down by 
classical Western virtue morality, Aristotle's and Cicero's, not to 
mention Augustine's and Aquinas' .19 He kept the aristocratic political 
structure but replaced the classic aristocratic virtues with his 
effectiveness-plus-efficiency, consequentialist ethic. His revolutionary 
proposal convinces many still today. Seldom, however, do the 
convinced publicly confess their conviction regarding the axis of 
overwhelming power, deceit, and secrecy.~0 
Tethered to the neo-con rejection of international law is a fourth 
millstone: "order" replaces law. World "order" not "law" is the basis 
of hegemonic rule.~ ' A world, decently ordered toward US interests, 
is of the highest national interest. 
[The neo-con notion] of national interest begins with 
the obvious point that our power relationship to the 
rest of the world has changed dramatically in the last 
decade. As the only nation in the world able to exert 
significant power beyond its own immediate 
geographical location, America now has the 
opportunity to enforce an order in all theaters where 
the local powers are not very great. If this 
opportunity exists, so too, arguably, does an interest 
in doing so, for having a decent order in the world is 
clearly to our benefit .... If so many of our statesmen 
in the nineteenth century publicly denied this view, 
especially with regard to any potential benefits 
accrued from the order established by the British 
Empire, this was for reasons of our own particular 
interest at a time when we were a secondary power.~~ 
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This is an ancient and weighty failure deep in Western public 
ethics. Plato and Aristotle precipitated it in two different but related 
forms. Order takes precedence over justice; or, the other form, order 
is the form of justice.43 Reinhold Niebuhr's pithy summary is still on 
target. The ancient western world, including Plato and Aristotle, 
emphasize[ d] order, not only as the primary but 
usually as the sole end of political life .... [They] 
insisted on paying an excessive price in justice for 
the sake of order, because the community and their 
order was never secure in the internal cohesions of 
the community and therefore depended upon an 
undue emphasis upon the authority of the ruler and 
upon the value of the boon of order which his 
authority maintained. 
The obvious difference of modern democratic 
communities is that they insist on justice, rather than 
order.44 
What Niebuhr attributed to democracy he could also have 
ascribed to the biblical God. 
In addition to substituting order for law, neo-cons 
enjoin the familiar cant: "can" - power plus 
opportunity - means "ought"-interest. With this 
combination neo-con internationalists revive once 
more the aristocratic impulse now globalized as an 
imperial impulse. Subordinating justice to order once 
again is an intolerable price to pay. The fourth 
millstone! Truth be told, subordinating justice has 
always been unsustainable as history time and again 
teaches. So does the apostle, "God is not mocked."45 
Neo-con internationalists constantly counsel and practice 
"resolve."46 "Resolve" is both a personal and a public character trait 
that has become a key marker whereby neo-cons self-identify one to 
another. They use numerous historical examples but none more 
powerfully and revealingly than the example of the British Empire 
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during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Briefly stated, 
"the British lacked the will" to maintain, strengthen, and extend its 
empire.H 
Again, neo-con internationalists take their cue from Machiavelli. 
Like his fellow Renaissance humanists Machiavelli retrieved an 
ancient classic insight in order to gain wisdom for his own time. High 
on the humanist agenda is the question of "fm1une." In the famous, 
penultimate chapter of The Prince Machiavelli explo1=es how a prince 
might possess Lady Fortune, literally, and thus be the successful 
prince. It will not be easy; she is wild. 
I compare her [Fortune] to one of those raging rivers 
.. . everything flies before it, all yield to its violence, 
without being able in any way to withstand it; and 
yet, though its nature be such, it does not follow 
therefore that men, when the weather becomes fair, 
shall not make provision, both with defenses and 
barriers, in such a manner that, rising again, the 
waters may pass away by canal, and their force be 
neither so unrestrained nor so dangerous. So it 
happens with fortune, who shows her power where 
valor has not prepared to resist her, and thither she 
turns her forces where she knows that barriers and 
defenses have not been raised to constrain her.4R 
The successful prince must, when all else is said and done, 
possess the virtue of manly valor in order to possess Lady Fortune. 
Machiavelli makes his point with a violently erotic image - though, 
surely, violence eclipses true eros. 
I conclude therefore that, fortune being changeful 
and man steadfast in their ways so long as the two 
are in agreement, men are successful, but 
unsuccessful when they fall out. For my part 1 
consider that it is better to be adventurous than 
cautious, because fortune is a woman, and if you 
wish to keep her under, it is necessary to beat and ill-
use her; and it is seen that she allows herself to be 
mastered by the adventurous rather than by those 
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who go to work more coldly. She is, therefore, 
always, woman-like, a lover of young men, because 
they are less cautious, more violent, and with more 
audacity command her.49 
Neo-cons discipline themselves toward manly "resolve" because 
they know their three opponents - not to mention raging Lady 
Fortune - are formidable, the three being international isolationists, 
realist internationalists, and liberal internationalists. As in classic 
aristocracy, neo-con moral resolve arrives with an epistemological 
resolve rooted in superior knowledge and understanding. This erotics 
of superior knowledge destines aristocrats, old and new, toward an 
erotics of overwhelming power, of global empire; and vice versa. Our 
theological vocation disciplines us to ask how the biblical God might 
come in opposition. In parts six and seven we ask this pointedly in the 
context of emerging publics of domestic and global civil society, 
publics pitied if not despised by neo-aristocrats. Presently we will see 
how "the Bush doctrine" within the comprehensive context of 
implicit imperialism presses the President toward epistemological 
resolve, toward a "no doubt presidency."10 
4. "The Bush Doctrine" as Implicit Imperialism 
"The Bush doctrine," as neo-con internationalists affectionately call 
it, integrates, indoctrinates, and executes the "much broader" vision 
of neo-con internationalism.s1 President Bush did not possess "the 
Bush doctrine" when he was elected in 2000. Neo-cons, of course, 
knew that. Truth be told, the President was not elected as a neo-con; 
neo-cons converted him, as they are well aware. When elected, he 
was some pathetic combination of isolationist and realist 
internationalist, according to neo-con lore, and on that they are right. 
Neo-cons detest both, especially when wimpishly combined. "The 
Bush doctrine" has steadily evolved since 9/1 1. Neo-con lore: after 
9/1 1 neo-cons breathed into George W. "the Bush doctrine" and he 
became a living President. 
Nine/eleven traumatized the President. He, like every US citizen 
and citizens throughout the world, was psychologically traumatized. 
As President his trauma quickly surfaced at the visionary level of 
international polity. His undisciplined diet of a little isolationism here 
and a little realism there left him and the country impotent, incapable 
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of responding, say the neo-cons. Neo-con internationalists saw this 
clearly; indeed, they anticipated it. They immediately named the 
"crisis" and seized the "opportunity."5~ They convinced the President 
that his trauma was a "crisis," doubly rooted, in his own faulty view 
of the presidency - the President thought presidency was primarily 
about domestic leadership - and in his own flabby vision of 
international polity. It's the vision thing; and neo-cons knew the way 
forward, implicit imperialism. 
Neo-cons have been developing their comprehensive vision at 
least since 1992 and had laid it out in 2000 in Present Dangers.~) 
Neo-cons identify three periods that the US is going through on its 
way toward realizing the imperial aspiration for "The New American 
Century": (I) 1989 to 9/ 11 /2001, the period of "American confusion 
and indecision"; (2) 911 1 to March 18, 2003, the day before the 
invasion of Iraq, the period of "illusions destroyed"; (3) March 19, 
2003, the invasion of Iraq, the period of "a new era of Pax 
Americana. "~4 Each period contains both a crisis and an opportunity. 
Each period is a stage in the Empire's coming of age. And, each stage 
of Empire depends of course on a parallel stage in the neo-cons' own 
work agenda. Period one is preparation, period two is indoctrination, 
and period three is execution. Prepare the comprehensive vision of 
empire, indoctrinate the President to indoctrinate the nation in "the 
Bush doctrine," and execute the empire, for the moment, as implicit 
imperialism. The present moment, like the previous, will produce 
crisis and thereby present opportunity. Readiness and resolve 
comprise the neo-con discipline for The New American Century. The 
next crisis will likely entail the opportunity for explicit empire. Neo-
cons have made themselves the great influence. The King's 
philosophers! Plato's "I Have a Dream." 
The neo-con account of "the Bush doctrine" contains three 
elements: active American global leadership, regime change, and 
promotion of liberal democratic principles.55 Note the words used: 
"leadership," "promotion of democratic principles," even "regime 
change." These words are purposefully conventional. The two 
administrations prior to President George W. Bush's - the elder 
Bush's administration and Clinton's administrations - had already 
used these very terms. So what's the big deal, neo-cons routinely say 
in public. Neo-cons have learned the lesson of 1992, and they have 
honed their linguistic discipline accordingly. The true trinity of "the 
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Bush doctrine" is: resolute unipolar hegemony, resolute preemptive 
war realism, and resolute mercenary-benevolent-capitalism 
(coalitions of the billing) - unshakeable building blocks of empire. 
Neo-cons base this trinity on the cleavage between a domestic rule of 
law and an international aristocratic ethos, as we have already seen. 
In part six we will note how neo-cons root this cleavage in a peculiar 
form of aristocratic democracy. 
"The Bush doctrine" has developed in four stages.56 First, on the 
evening of September 11, 2001 the President vowed to a national and 
international television audience to bring justice "to those who are 
behind these evil acts" and to "those who harbored them." Second, in 
his September 20, 2001 address to the US Congress, he noted that the 
US is at war not only with particular terrorists but with terrorism itself, 
with "every terrorist group of global reach ... [and with] nations that 
provide aid or safe haven to terrorism." Third, on November 6, 200 I 
he defined "our [US] mission and our moment" to the Warsaw 
Conference on Combating Terrorism in this way: not only will the US 
fight the evil of terrorism "until we're rid of it," but, "[w]e will not 
wait for the authors of mass murder to gain the weapons of mass 
destruction." This was the first time that the President placed the 
question of weapons of mass destruction within the context of a 
comprehensive war on terrorism. Also it was the first definitive, 
though still embryonic, identification ofhis "doctrine of preemption." 
The fourth stage of"the Bush doctrine" arrives in the President's 
January 25, 2002 State of the Union address. This stage is the crucial 
stage, "the completion" stage, of "the Bush doctrine."~7 In this stage 
three elements congeal and thus solidify "the Bush doctrine." The 
President notes that the war has "two great objectives." The first is to 
defeat terrorism. For neo-cons that's fine, but in itself defeating 
terrorism is not "great." It is too small. In itself it is still "America-
lite." Only the second of the President's "great objectives" is truly 
"great." Only the second is "the true Bush doctrine": "to prevent 
regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or our friends 
and allies with weapons of mass destruction." Prevent threats. 
Prevent them whether imminent or not. And imminent or not, prevent 
them in any way that is effective and efficient. Prevent threats is the 
first element toward completion. 
The President then identifies North Korea, Iran, and Iraq as an 
"axis of evil." The neo-cons: 
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So much for our previous diplomatic efforts with 
North Korea. So much for the claim that Iraq has 
been successfully kept "in a box." So much for our 
new "constructive" relationship with Iran. No. These 
regimes constitute a growing danger, the president 
asserted - breaking definitely with the complacency 
of his predecessor and the wishfulness of his own 
State Department.sR 
Neo-cons consider Bush's "axis of evil" remark to go beyond the 
mere identification of three "rogue states." It is a declared '"Axis of 
Evil' doctrine."'9 It has a teaching function. It teaches that in "the 
unipolar era" the world is always self-evidently divisible between 
good and evil. The good are those who are unquestioningly with us. 
This renders everyone else against us, in effect accomplices of evil. 
What is becoming clear is that even the so-called war on 
terrorism is only a front, a stooge for empire. Evil is not even some 
other real pole; evil is privation pure and simple, a depraved Jack of 
recognition of unambiguous unipolarity, of "The American Century." 
Evil is the un-real. Good-or-evil unipolarity is the second element of 
the completion stage. Apocalypticism! 
"Powell's Moment" signals the progress of"the Bush doctrine." 
In neo-con chronology this refers to the week between February 2 
and 9, 2002, when Secretary of State Colin Powell abandoned the 
"dovish sensibilities" of "the Powell doctrine," which till then had 
infested the George W. presidency as it had softened the first Bush 
presidency a decade earlier. Being "a late convert to the Bush 
doctrine," "ironically" makes Powell "its most effective proponent .... 
Once deployed, Powell could be America's most formidable non-
exploding weapon."r.<• This comes true exactly a year later when 
Powell appears before the United Nations. Truly prescient! 
Now the third element solidifYing the fourth stage of "the Bush 
doctrine" appears. Resolve! Again, the President, January 25, 2002: 
"The United States of America will not permit the world's most 
dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive 
weapons." Neo-cons consider this "the most significant sentence 
spoken by an American president in almost 20 years."61 "Resolve" 
pertains not just to one or another strategic plan or tactical 
engagement; rather, it pertains to the comprehensive vision, 
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indoctrination, and execution of implicit imperialism on the way to 
the explicit empire of"The New American Century." Christened with 
resolve "the Bush doctrine" actualizes neo-con expectations. "The 
Bush doctrine" is complete; the indoctrination period culminates. 
The enduring "doctrines" of unipolarity, preemption, evil axis, 
and resolve place the crown on implicit imperialism. In September 
2002 the President released The National Security Strategy of the 
United States. This is "the Bush doctrine" as finished product.61 "The 
Bush doctrine" is no longer a mere collection of themes that the US 
can prudentially take or leave depending on circumstance. Using the 
categories of classic political philosophy, neo-cons have created - or 
helped the President to create, whichever- "the Bush doctrine" as 
both a "treatise" and a "tract." 
A treatise decrees enduring, even timeless principles; a tract for 
the times transmits the decrees to the appropriate audience.(,l As a 
treatise The National Security Strategy is "the most significant US 
foreign policy statement since NSC 68, the 1950 paper that codified 
the containment doctrine."64 As a treatise neo-cons aim only to extend 
its global reach to encompass not just Afghanistan, at Qaeda, Iraq, 
North Korea, and Iran, but also "Central Asia," "Southeast Asia" 
especially Indonesia and the Philippines, "East Asia" especially 
China, and not to forget "the Balkans" and "the Sinai."M Neo-cons 
compare US unipolarity to that enjoyed by history's grandest empires 
-the Roman Empire, the Persian Empire, Charlemagne's Empire, the 
Chinese Empire, the British Empire and then conclude: "no 
comparison."66 US unipolarization can and thereby ought to surpass 
every previous empire. 
Neo-cons proudly declare that "the Bush doctrine" 
entails "quite a change from US tradition."67 Again, 
note the linguistic discipline, "quite a change." 
Indeed! "The Bush doctrine" erodes the gathering 
consensus of US nonnative tradition, though an 
imperial attitude has always had hold claimed a hold, 
and it cuts against US normative patriotism/'' Having 
successfully breathed "the Bush doctrine," neo-cons 
have only to compose a tract-for-the-times. This 
includes securing the financial funding - big-time 
funding - for "the Bush doctrine's" "bold new 
course."69 
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We have already located Machiavelli's unrivaled, overwhelming 
power - the lion - in the neo-con, aristocratic moral rationale for 
hegemonic, unipolar power and seen it enthroned in "the Bush 
doctrine." We have also located Machiavelli's deception - the fox -
in neo-con aristocratic morality and have seen it embodied in the neo-
con linguistic discipline of systemic deception. Now we can 
accurately locate the other trait ofMachiavelli's fox, its "secrecy," the 
loyal twin of deception. Systematic deception functions in public 
arenas. It habitually disseminates misinformation. Further, when 
publics do discern truth, disseminators resolutely claim that the 
disinformation is merely misinformation. This erodes public trust and 
inhibits public accountability. "Secrecy" functions publicly to hide 
the personal life and character of a public person, in our case, the 
person of the President. Secrecy, then, is different from privacy, 
which public persons need and to which they have a right. 
Machiavelli counsels. 
Therefore it is unnecessary for a prince to haye all 
the good qualities I have enumerated, but it is very 
necessary to appear to have them. And I shall dare to 
say this also, that to have them and always to observe 
them is injurious, and that to appear to have them is 
useful; to appear merciful, faithful, humane, 
religious, upright, and to be so, but with a mind so 
framed that should you require not to be so, you may 
be able and know how to change to the opposite .... 
For this reason a prince ought to take care that he 
never lets anything slip from his lips that is not 
replete with the above-named five qualities, that he 
may appear to him who sees and hears him 
altogether merciful, faithful, humane, upright, and 
religious. There is nothing more necessary to appear 
to have than this last quality, inasmuch as men judge 
generally more by the eye than by the hand, because 
it belongs to everybody to see you, to few to come in 
touch with you. Every one sees what you appear to 
be, few really know what you are, and those few dare 
not oppose themselves to the opinion of the many, 
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who have the majesty of the state to defend them; 
and in the actions of all men, and especially of 
princes, which it is not prudent to challenge, one 
judges by the result.711 
An irony arises when secrecy meets US public life, and 
Machiavelli could not have anticipated it. US normative patriotism 
rejects the aristocratic ethos. Emma Lazarus poetically engraved this 
refusal on the Statue of Liberty in the first words spoken by the 
Mother ofExiles. 
Keep ancient lands, your storied pomp. 
In this refusal the Mother of Exiles is emphatically 
Not like the brazen giant of Greek fame, 
with conquering limbs astride from land to land. 71 
In part six we will explore the preferred horizon that Lazarus 
illuminates. For now it is enough to observe that public persons 
regularly elect not to appear aristocratic, especially if they really are -
the heightened publicity of a president intensifies this choice. 
Aristocrats conceal themselves. President Bush does this with aplomb. 
The President intentionally and effortlessly lives a double life. In 
public he emphasizes his "aw shucks" persona and does so in two 
prominent ways. First, as a Texas cowboy, he appears about as 
"common" as one can get in a country steeped in cowboy lore. 
Second, he speaks with a strong evangelical Christian accent - often 
modulating fundamentalist and Pentecostal accents as well - that 
appeals to the middle, even working, class. For instance, he skillfully 
employs the one discourse that unites the otherwise quite different 
accents found in Christian evangelicalism, fundamentalism, and 
Pentecostalism: the discourse of"l once was morally lost but now am 
morally sound." The President occasionally plays up his background 
in major league baseball, "America's pastime." But the reputation of 
billionaire owners renders that persona too precarious. Notice, he 
never publicly trumpets his oil persona! 
Now comes the secrecy. Behind the doors that close off the US 
public from his aristocratic kin and ken, the President readily presents 
and practices his full aristocratic credentials.n Here we have the sheer 
reverse of the "double consciousness" that African-Americans 
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learned in order to survive slavery and continued to practice with 
aplomb long after legalized slavery ended.'1 
5. The Iraq War as Execution of Empire - Implicitly, 
Explicitly 
Neo-cons invented the Iraq War. They invented it long before 9/11. 
That is, they invented, even created, its comprehensive purpose and 
meaning.'4 They did this during the preparation period, chronicled 
above. Only since the crisis of 9/ 11 did the opportunity arise to vest 
the President and US publics with their invention. Their invention? 
The Iraq War as the Empire's first strike and its first outpost. This is 
what neo-cons mean by "taking the [Iraq] war beyond terrorism."'5 
Under linguistic discipline the President would not, however, 
present the explicit imperialist invention to US or global publics. He 
offered, instead, an imminent threat rationale that would sound 
plausible within the just war tradition's moral criteria. Futther, as 
neo-cons imagined, and likely planned, he sent Secretary of State 
Colin Powell, "America's most formidable non-exploding weapon" 
to make it happen. 
Armed with epistemological resolve Secretary Powell 
admonished the world on February 5, 2003. "The gravity of this 
moment is matched by the gravity of the threat that Iraq's weapons of 
mass destruction pose to the world. Let me now turn to those deadly 
weapons programs and describe why they are real and present 
dangers to the region and to the world."76 Numerous other US 
officials, each a prominent neo-con, had made similar assertions prior 
to Powell's.77 On October 7, 2002 the President said in a speech in 
Cincinnati, OH: "The danger is already significant and it only grows 
worse with time. If we know Saddam Hussein has dangerous 
weapons today - and we do - does it make any sense for the world to 
wait to confront him as he grows even stronger and develops even 
more dangerous weapons?" Even after the invasion the President said 
in May 2003 in Poland, "We found the weapons of mass destruction. 
You know, we found biological weapons." Neo-con George F. Will 
calls such remarks "accumulating errors ... [due to] "rhetorical 
carelessness and overreaching."7~ "Overreaching"? Indeed, as in 
Empire. "Rhetorical carelessness"? Not so! Empire begets 
epistemological resolve. Is it true, Mr. Will, that foxes never blink? 
Empire breeds systemic deception. 
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Oh, what a tangled web we weave, 
When first we practice to deceive! 
Consensus 
Prior to the invasion many who opposed the Iraq War knew of the 
neo-con invention and contested it accordingly. Others opposed the 
War because it did not meet "just war tradition" moral criteria like 
just cause and/or last resort. Numerous events beginning especially in 
January 2004 have increasingly exposed the Iraq War for what it has 
always been, the prototype invention of implicit imperialism. The 
absence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction after the intensive, 
nine-month search has sent neo-cons scrambling to paste together a 
new "moral" justification for the War. In reality it appears that neo-
cons will invent numerous rationales and flood the public with 
several at a time; cats, and foxes, are famously difficult to corral. 
Some War apologists simply deceive by denying that the 
President ever justified the War because of an imminent threat of 
WMD.79 The President never used the phrase "imminent threat," they 
say with the churlish delight of sophomores with crossed fingers 
behind their backs. This blatant deception approach is then followed 
with a host of other items that supposedly were the real sufficient 
reasons given by the President. These apologists cite eleven reasons: 
Saddam 1) twice invaded his neighbors, 2) used chemical weapons to 
commit genocide against the Iraqi Kurds, 3) ethnically cleansed the 
Marsh Arabs, 4) maintained terrorist training camps, 5) tried to 
assassinate a former US president, 6) threatened to take revenge on 
America, 7) was shooting at American aircraft over Iraq's "no-fly" 
zones, 8) was sending money to Palestinian terrorists, 9) had violated 
more than a dozen U.N. resolutions agreed to in exchange for the 
1991 cease fire, 1 0) forced out U.N. weapons inspectors, and II) 
convinced "every major intelligence service in the world ... that he 
was continuing to develop weapons of mass destruction."80 
Apparently, Saddam convinced them by patently telling them that he 
did not have WMD. Furthermore, the eleventh rationale is simply 
false; there were major intelligence services decidedly and vocally 
not convinced. 
Since January 2004 other War apologists are publicly 
propagating a justification for the war that has nothing to do with 
weapons of mass destruction and little to do with that laundry list of 
Saddam mad-man items, though these apologists may also include 
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some of those items ad hoc. This new public rationale is actually the 
originally invented rationale, never publicly declared due to neo-con 
linguistic discipline. Ironically, this War apologetic exposes the Iraq 
War for what it has always been, that is, the neo-con prototype of 
Empire, implicit imperialism. In his 2004 State of the Union Address 
the President himself used this new War apologetic. This innovative 
rationale is quite different from the justification argued in his 2003 
State of the Union Address. 
The 2004 justification goes like this. "Because of American 
leadership and resolve, the world is changing for the better." Notice 
the neo-con identity marker "resolve." Notice, too, the strict 
linguistic discipline regarding "leadership." Neo-cons know this 
means "imperial hegemony." In neo-con discourse the President is 
saying that "the world is changing for the better" because of"the Pax 
Americana," "The New American Century." The President 
immediately follows up "changing for the better" by pointing to 
Libya's recent pledge to disclose and dismantle its weapons of mass 
destruction. The Iraq War is and always has been about "sending a 
message." The President again, "For diplomacy to be effective, words 
must be credible, and no one can now doubt the word of America."81 
Hegemonic theorists, who study the ways of effective and 
efficient empires, know that an empire, especially during a nascent 
and more implicit phase, must learn to "send a message." 
Maintaining and expanding an empire is costly, both from an 
economic perspective and from a domestic and international public 
opinion perspective. War intervals are especially costly and 
precarious in both ways.~2 Effective empires must increase their 
efficiencies by well-timed, properly planned and publicized events of 
"shock and awe." A "shock and awe" message "heard 'round the 
world" is the efficiently effective way to put the world on alert. The 
President's War does not put only terrorists and "rogue nations," who 
might aid and abet terrorists, on alert. Remember, neo-cons readily 
take the War beyond tetTorism. Rather, the President's War puts 
everyone on alert, anyone who is not totally, uncritically with the 
empire stands against the empire. This is what the world famous 
"freedom fries" humbug is all about. This is what the President means 
by "no one can now doubt the word of America."83 This is why 
imperialism and war realism are the identical twins that habitually 
execute wars of desire as normal politics. The President's rhetoric 
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strategy in the 2004 State of the Union Address is well-known. He 
intentionally employs a classic fallacy of logic, which every high-
school student who has ever taken Debate 101 and Logic 1 01 learns: 
post hoc, ergo, propter hoc - "after this, therefore, because of this." 
After the Iraq War, therefore, because of the Iraq War! Neo-con 
discourse will credit the President's "leadership and resolve" - really 
their own superior understanding and character - for every 
economically, morally and politically desirable outcome from here to 
eternity. We will be treated with a never-ending, progressively 
ascending, slippery slope of wonderful consequences. In these ways 
empire is "strategically sound and morally right."R4 We must restore 
debate and logic to our core curriculums. 
Neo-cons routinely counter the public disapproval of the War's 
imperialist meanings in one of three ways, or in some combination. 
First, neo-cons advise stonewalling though this regularly backfires 
with global and US publics. Second, they employ classic "red 
herring" linguistic practices. A bucket of red herrings has always 
been effective. Neo-cons throw out one or another of the War's 
possible many, minor meanings, which we cited earlier. These many 
meanings, each likely containing an element of truth, are 
epiphenomena, i.e., side issues, in comparison with Iraq's 
comprehensive meaning. Like the "red herring," these side issues 
bear less weight but yield big smells. Practiced bloodhounds 
recognize the big smell for what it is and refuse to be distracted from 
the critical pursuit. Neo-cons also use creative combinations. Third, 
as already noted, they practice delicate linguistic discipline. 
Dismantling stone walls, eluding red herrings, and discerning the 
linguistic discipline of implicit imperialism are tough but terribly 
important tasks, which critics of the War's imperialist meanings must 
maintain. It takes resolve. This prophetic resolve is not based, 
however, in re-masculinized violence but is rooted in the hope of a 
deliberative ethos.85 
Finally, neo-cons expertly co-opt "multilateral" internationalists 
for the neo-con creation. This is a key strategy for ending "the battle 
between American primacy and multipolarity, [which] is nearing an 
end - and what is to come is a world that no one ever imagined," "an 
enduring Pax Americana."86 Thomas Friedman, well-known 
columnist at the New York Times, is a good case study. In an editorial, 
Friedman laments the "dichotomy" between the National Football 
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League's "frivolous and gross" 2004 Super Bowl and the ongoing 
War in which soldiers continually die daily bearing the whole burden 
themselves. 117 How can the US be "just sailing along" normally? 
Friedman continues his scold. "And what bothers me ever more 
is that this dichotomy is exactly what the Bush team wants." Well, of 
course, Mr. Friedman. At the heart of neo-con logic is that the US is 
no longer a "normal nation" as normally conceived. Rather, neo-cons 
passionately - erotically - desire that the US be a nonnal Empire, 
actually to be the normative Empire by which any future empire must 
be normed. This "dichotomy" is imperially normal and normative. 
While Friedman continues as he has in the past to criticize "the 
antiwar left," no matter "how mangled was the Bush road to war," he 
holds his harshest criticism for "the Bush conservatives." The War 
"can't be won with an 'idealism' that is selfish, greedy, arrogant, 
incapable of self-criticism and believing that all that matters is our 
will and power and nothing else." Friedman deludes himself by 
thinking that he could prescribe just one additional ingredient, 
something "else," that would balance out, or absorb, or some such, all 
those other foibles. 
Friedman's something "else" is multilateralism, multipolarity. 
"We can defeat Saddam alone. But we can't build a decent political 
center alone. We don't have enough legitimacy or staying power. We 
need to enlist all our allies - including France, Germany and the U.N. 
Security Council - in this titanic struggle." Friedman calls this "the 
great mistake of the neo-cons and this administration." First, the 
elements in his list - in itself an accurate enough listing - are not 
merely unfortunate foibles accidentally attached to neo-con 
internationalism; these elements are its substance. Friedman's list is 
neo-con imperialism, heart and soul. Second, neo-cons have already 
ingested and digested Friedman's other ingredient, his something 
"else." How is this so? 
Neo-cons call it, "multilateralism, American style. "88 "Most 
American multilateralists are unilateralists at the core." They call this 
the "quintessentially American view." Neo-cons think that the US 
should always seek to "enlist" - the tenn Friedman uses - as many 
allies as possible, even the United Nations, on any issue we want to. 
This is the vaunted coalition of the willing. Routinely, however, the 
willing looks more like a coalition of the billing - nations whose 
economic bills the US promises to pay off. No matter the outcome of 
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this enlisting, "we'll do what we want." The neo-con creation of 
"American multilateralism" is not "a principled multilateralism" tied 
to "an international legal order." The latter vision belonged to 
President Clinton, the target of neo-con derision. 
As we have seen, neo-cons reject an international rule of law as 
the first commandment ofneo-con internationalism. This makes them 
"instrumental internationalists," "pragmatic internationalists," as 
they argue. Neo-con multilateralists employ "a cost-benefit analysis, 
not a principled commitment to multilateral action as the cornerstone 
of world order." 
"In an age of American hegemony, it will be multilateralism, 
American style," say the neo-cons. They speak a rhetoric of 
multilateral ism, actually a "blend of unilateral ism and multilateralism 
[which] reflects," they claim, "a broad and deep American 
consensus." Their "multilateralism" remakes the US in their own 
image. Internationally, neo-cons desire "a government of men" not 
"of law," a world of 'the man,' not a world 'of law.' This reverses US 
normative patriotism. The difference between instrumental 
internationalism and principled internationalism is not one of style 
but of substance. Neo-cons know this, despite the cutesy, pop T.V. 
allusion. Instrumental internationalists are principled imperialists. 
The cloak is foxy; don't you think, Mr. Friedman? 
Rejecting the rule of law leads neo-cons to imperialism and war 
realism. The just war tradition fits the world of law. Indeed, 
historically the just war tradition has propelled the Western world 
toward an international rule of law. For neo-con internationalists the 
just war tradition is just one more thing to instrumentalize. They will 
use just war criteria when it suits them and they will dispose of just 
war criteria when the criteria are a nuisance. 
Neo-cons use the just war tradition as they use multilateral ism, as 
just so much cover. The biblical "not in vain" command - the Second 
Commandment as Lutherans number them - prohibits blasphemy, 
prohibits defaming God's name, God's fame, God's character. That 
is, it prohibits taking something that is Godly and using it as cover, as 
a cloak. On the political level the Second Commandment demands 
truth not deception; on the moral level candor not craft; on the 
theological level repentance not denial, honour not blasphemy. 
Just war tradition apologists, as am I and as is the Lutheran 
heritage, must expose instrumentalizing a Godly tradition. The 
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President said, "I am a war president."R9 Just war presidents, too, can 
be saved! 90 Neo-cons, however, have breathed "the Bush doctrine" 
into the President and he has become a living, war-realist, an implicit 
imperialist. A more Godly case can be made for a different US 
internationalism. 
6. Deliberative Democracy and Emerging Civil Society 
Neo-con discipleship prods US and international publics "to stop 
worrying and love the Pax Americana."91 I urge a different 
international discipleship. This different discipleship can be, and is, 
rooted in numerous religious and non-religious traditions. Though 
not uniquely Christian it is characteristically Christian and 
characteristically Lutheran. In its characteristically Lutheran form it 
begins by acknowledging that the biblical God creatively continues to 
call things into being (Rom 4: 17). Beginning thus, Christians seek to 
discern where and how and for what purposes the triune God is 
bringing new things into being, new natural, social, and political 
realities. Indeed, God commands people, all people, to honour God 
precisely in these worldly places and ways and purposes.92 
Can we imagine a different international discipleship in which 
God is bringing an emerging global civil society into social and 
political being? Can we honour God by critically participating in this 
emerging international phenomenon? To make this different 
discipleship plausible for Christians, indeed, for anyone, we will 
explore what we mean by an emerging global civil society and how 
it contributes to the Godly character of international life. This will 
provide a warrant for our claim that God is against empire creating, 
instead, a preferential option for a civic internationalist ethos. Only a 
sketch is possible in this essay. 
Like many before and after him, Martin Luther, too, addressed 
Plutarch's "Who, then, shall rule the ruler?"91 Luther, also, said "law." 
For Luther, however, law is always God's just law. Luther's 
theological question, then, is how God holds rulers accountable to 
God's law of justice. Rulers, as Luther was quite sure, sometimes 
(perhaps often) do whatever they please; and what they fancy does 
not always, perhaps not often, conform to God's just law. What, then, 
are God's this-worldly media for ruling the ruler? 
Luther discerned four- more like three and a half- this-worldly 
media. First, there are "God's extraordinary leaders."94 Sometimes 
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these "extraordinary leaders" are themselves political rulers; often 
times they are not. They have "a special star before God" and are not 
so much trained or made as "created" and taught directly by God. 
They possess a special endowment of "natural law and natural 
reason." God raises up "such jewels, when, where, and to whom He 
pleases" "not only among His own people but also among the godless 
and the heathen; and not only in the ranks of the nobility but also 
among the middle classes, farmers, and laborers." 
Luther's second this-worldly medium of God's rule ofthe rulers 
is the "office" of "a preacher by whom God rebukes" political rulers. 
They are to exercise the wide admonitory power of the preaching 
office "uprightly and honestly," "openly and boldly."9; This 
admonitory duty of the preaching office is "not seditious," but "on the 
contrary a praiseworthy, noble, and rare virtue, and a particularly 
great service to God." In many treatises Luther himself consciously 
exercised the admonitory power of his office. 
A third medium is external enemies. God can use a ruler's 
external enemies in order to hold a ruler accountable to God's just 
law. God even uses external enemies who themselves do not practice 
justice in order to rule an unjust ruler, a sort of medium of last resort 
on God's part. The aggressive Turkish army under Suleiman the 
Magnificent was Luther's contemporary instance. Because the Holy 
Roman Empire, including the German people, practiced injustice and 
persecuted the gospel, "the Turk ... is God's rod and the devil's 
servant [Is 1 0:5]; there is no doubt about that."96 "God has mastered 
the art of punishing one thief by means of another," also in the 
political arena.97 
Luther identifies - rather, intuits - a fourth this-worldly 
medium through which God rules the rulers. Addressing his own 
soon-to-be prince Luther notes, "The common man [sic] is learning 
to think."98 He takes this as a political hermeneutic for interpreting 
Psalm I 07:40 "God pours contempt upon princes." The common 
people of his time were acquiring the necessary capacities for moral 
and political reflection about the public world of political rule. 
"Men will not, men cannot, men refuse to endure your tyranny and 
wantonness much longer. Dear princes and lords be wise and guide 
yourselves accordingly. God will no longer tolerate it. The world is 
no longer what it once was, when you hunted and drove the people 
like game." 
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Luther's world was changing as the moral and political capacity 
of common people was changing. This impressed Luther and thus he 
advised rulers, "therefore, no man is to be despised, [for God] once 
spoke through the mouth of an ass [Num. 22:28]."99 Luther, of course, 
could not imagine any enduring medium capable of institutionalizing 
his intuition. Biblical and historical precedent and his personal 
experience were the sources of his intuition. The best he could do was 
to urge rulers to develop the personal virtue of seeking moral wisdom 
in common people. Only one of Luther's three and a half media of 
divine accountability was institutionalized, was an "office." The 
extra-ordinary leaders, the external enemies, and the nascent political 
capacities of common people were all ad hoc media, random acts of 
divine accountability, one might say. Luther's access to Plutarch's 
question likely came through his reading of Cicero, also a likely 
source for his intuition regarding common people's political capacity. 
Cicero ( 106-43 BC) had examined these questions over a century 
before Plutarch. Cicero, like Aristotle before him, identified three 
basic forms of rule: monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy 
(republic). 1110 Each has strengths and weaknesses, though a democracy 
"is the least to be preferred" and a monarchy "is far the best." 101 
Cicero really prefers a fourth form, "a mean and a mixture" of the 
previous three, enshrined in a written constitution. 102 The constitution 
was a mechanism with weights and counter-weights. But a state, 
according to Cicero, is more than a machine; it is a living being 
directed by spirit. The spirit is the public opinion of all the classes of 
people together. Cicero's problem comes at this point and he is quite 
aware of it. In his day there was no medium for public opinion, for 
the formation, testing, and reformation of spirit. There was no press, 
no "fourth estate" as the eighteenth century would come to call it. The 
growth of news media in the eighteenth century was socially and 
politically revolutionary because it initiated a democratic public 
sphere.w1 This made possible what Cicero could merely imagine but 
not pull off. That was left to the US founders with much help from 
their many thoughtful forerunners. 
We come to the story of constitutional democracy and its three 
forms: aristocratic-republic, liberal, and deliberative. 104 Historically 
the aristocratic-republic form goes back to ancient Rome at least. Its 
communitarian and aristocratic shape influenced certain streams of 
the US founders. In this form the virtuous, organically homogenous 
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community precedes the state and the constitution's purpose is to 
ensure that the state as a whole becomes virtuous. Therefore, the 
constitution must especially guarantee that the trustees of community 
vittue are enabled to train both the young and the 'fallen' citizenry in 
the ways of the virtuous community. 
The liberal form is often associated with John Locke- though not 
exclusively - who stressed the rights of individuals. In this fotm the 
constitution's purpose is to establish and protect well-defined zones 
of privacy where individual citizens are free from state coercion and 
protected from communal compulsion. In this more atomistic model 
individuals are free to own private property, enter into contracts to 
increase property, and generally to determine one's own life plans 
according to private choice as long as this does not prohibit others 
from doing the same. The prime mandate in the liberal fonn of 
democracy is the constraint of neutrality. Never disagree in public 
about the things that are morally most important. Keeping our really 
big ethical disagreements private, especially those with an obvious 
religious timbre, promotes tolerance. 
These two forms of the democratic constitutional state have 
remained in tension throughout US history. Each has been 
accompanied by a "third sector," as it is often called. The third sector 
is that sector of public life that is neither the constitutional state nor 
the economic market, sectors one and two in whichever order. The 
third sector is simply "numbered" because its purposes and functions 
remain fluid. In fact, the third sector's purposes and functions depend 
on which form of democracy it is paired with. When paired with the 
aristocratic-republic model the third sector entails institutions that 
mediate - mediating institutions - communitarian virtues. This 
certainly involves forming the virtues of the young. It likewise 
involves forming the virtues of the domestic and immigrant masses, 
especially the workplace virtues of the laboring classes. Mediating 
institutions provide the advantaged class with opportunities to do 
works of mercy and otherwise offer charity to those who have 
"fallen" through the cracks of the economic system or who have 
"fallen" on bad fortune. The offer of charity also goes to those who 
have "fallen" victim to their own vices and who desire to amend their 
lives. This latter form of charity fulfills the highest obligation of the 
virtuous because it meets the greatest need of the fallen. It is the 
charity most esteemed and therefore most pursued. 
http://scholars.wlu.ca/consensus/vol29/iss2/2
God Against Empire 43 
In the liberal form of constitutional democracy the third sector is 
composed of voluntary associations with different purposes and 
functions. In the liberal model the third sector may also provide 
safety-net services and opportunities for charity as indicated above. 
But the third sector has two loftier purposes. First, it functions as a 
border, so to speak, clearly partitioning public and private spheres. 
Voluntary associations that specialize in maintaining the partition 
receive the highest regard. Second, voluntary associations proliferate, 
which aim to refresh and enhance the well-being of private 
individuals who regularly get worn down in the grind of the economy 
and of life in general. Within the liberal form voluntary associations 
aim to be havens in an otherwise heartless world. This purpose covers 
the waterfront of body, mind, and spirit. 
The deliberative form of constitutional democracy embodies a 
communicative ethos, different from the private-choice focus of the 
liberal form or the virtue-training focus of the aristocratic-republic 
fonn. The communicative focus of the deliberative form highlights the 
public reasoning of all citizens who continuously speak together for 
the purposes of coming to mutual understanding, just law, and public 
action. Paired with deliberative democracy the third sector has a 
primary purpose different from the purposes served within the other 
two forms, though without excluding those purposes. With the 
deliberative form the third sector locates, indeed, embodies a citizenry 
of communicative reasoning. Only with deliberative democracy does 
the third sector emerge as "civil society." Or, perhaps a better way to 
put it, a gradually prevailing communicative ethos transforms the third 
sector into "civil society," and this transformation brings about a more 
deliberative form ofthe democratic constitutional state. 
Deliberative democracy takes key elements from both the 
aristocratic-republic and the liberal forms. It, then, roots these 
elements in the richer soil of everyday speech and conversation. Like 
the aristocratic-republic form, deliberative democracy gives center 
stage to the political formation of public moral opinion. In this way 
deliberative democracy invests the political process with ethical 
connotations more robust than found in the liberal model but with 
less communal homogeneity and paternalism than found in the 
aristocratic-republic form. 
Like the liberal and unlike the aristocratic-republic, however, 
deliberative democracy also prioritizes the equal rights of citizens to 
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2004
44 Consensus 
participate n the political formation of public moral-ethical opinion. 
This priority includes the corresponding participatory procedures. 
Not only must political decision-makers be political consequence-
takers, but also political consequence-takers must be political 
decision-makers. The equal right of citizen participation implies the 
equal obligation of citizens to participate. Indeed, how deliberative 
democracy obligates its citizens to pa11icipate politically is crucial! 
Deliberative democracy obligates citizen participation by providing 
an economic, political, and humane infrastructure at least minimally 
sufficient to sustain all citizens for participation. 
Finally, deliberative democracy prioritizes a circulation of 
political power that is vigorously open to a third sector now 
communicatively transformed into civil society. First, it is important 
to note that the word "civil" in civil society does not mean 
"civilized," as in a civilized society. "Civil" also does not here mean 
the virtue called "civility" as in "a society that practices civility." It is 
true that from time to time people use the phrase "civil society" with 
those meanings. And, certainly, there is nothing wrong with 
"civility." Generally speaking, when a major newspaper, for instance, 
uses the term "civil society," it is a sociological and political 
category. 
Civil society is a component of the general architecture, so to 
speak, of public life. Civil society is that great plurality of 
movements, associations, and institutions which emerges out of the 
everyday life of citizens and residents for the prevention and 
promotion of this, that, and the other thing. In this way civil society 
is a public threshold that in one direction mingles and overlaps with 
the less public sides of life. As a public threshold in the other 
direction civil society mingles and overlaps with the great systems of 
the market economy and the political state. Here we can look only at 
the overlap with the political state. 
Because civil society is this two-sided threshold, its preferential 
purpose in a deliberative democracy is to be a "sleuth" comprised of 
citizens attaining moral wisdom by reasoning together about 
problems encountered, opportunities presented, obligations faced, 
and rights required. Civil society's purpose in a deliberative 
democracy is to be a "sluice" for circulating moral wisdom 
concerning common goods into the political spheres of the 
legislative, executive, and judicial workings of the state. These 
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preferential purposes of sleuth and sluice can also encompass 
purposes which the third sector held within the aristocratic-republic 
and liberal fonns of democracy. 
Within deliberative democracy civil society's preferential 
purposes involve citizens in the public work of ethics. The historic 
co-emergence of civil society and deliberative democracy addresses 
Plutarch's question in a fashion that Cicero could only faintly intuit. 
Abraham Lincoln's digest of deliberative democracy as "government 
of the people, by the people, for the people" remains provocative still 
today. '"5 Lincoln knew monarchy as government "for" the people. He 
knew aristocracy as government "of" and "for" the people. He 
experienced democracy as government "of, by, and for" the people. 
The "by" is the constant feedback loop testing, strengthening, and 
refonning the "of," and deliberating the entire range of goods needed 
"for" all the people to be "We, the people." In this experience he 
understood the "by" as the deliberative reality that encompassed his 
own life from the Kentucky log cabin to the US legislature, to the 
Washington White House, to the Gettysburg graveyard. 
Lincoln understood the "by" as the deliberative reality of equality 
that must embrace the public life of these United States of America. 
Emma Lazarus would indelibly inscribe this reality in her famed 
words: 
Give me your tired, your poor, 
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free, 
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore. 
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me, 
I lift my lamp beside the golden door. 
Aristocrats, ignoring Liberty's rebuke of "storied pomp," 
regularly mouth these words, sensing mostly the need for workers in 
the fields and the factories and the markets. '06 Despite her aristocratic 
upbringing, Lazarus knew, because she had been a frequent victim of 
anti-Semitism, that only Lincoln's egalitarian "by" could satisfy that 
"yearning to breathe free." 
Lincoln was America's public theologian, many say our greatest. 
It comes as no surprise, then, that immediately prior to his famous 
democratic digest Lincoln invoked God to deliver "a new birth" of 
precisely such a government of, by, for the people. Lincoln, too, knew 
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Cicero, and he was quite aware of monarchist, aristocrat, and 
imperialist renunciations of Cicero's vox populi est vox dei. 107 Yet, he 
was neither persuaded nor deterred. He simply thought that 
monarchists, aristocrats, and imperialists were theologically hard of 
hearing. He believed the biblical God capable of delivering new birth 
and he discerned in the still small voice of the people the voice of the 
living God. God does not grant new births in vain, thought Lincoln. 
Therefore, a deliberating people is God's preferred future for 
mediating just law; it ought "not perish from the earth." 10R What was 
barely conceivable for Cicero and only randomly perceivable by 
Luther became normatively operable in Lincoln. 
7. Honouring God in Global Civil Society 
If, indeed, God is creatively working moral wisdom in the sleuthing 
and sluicing purposes of civil society and deliberative democracy, 
then we have a warrant for posing our claim. The biblical God is 
against empire and for something else, for a nascent international rule 
of law emerging in and with global civil society}09 
Early signs of global civil society include the burgeoning non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and international non-
governmental organizations (INGOs). Christians and Lutherans have 
for some time been in full communion with NGOs and INGOs. Note, 
however, the negative identity! We know what they are not; do we 
know what they are, what purpose they have? Their non character 
mirrors the anonymity of the so-called "third" sector. The 
transformation of the "third" sector into civil society has come about 
for various reasons. A chief reason was their coming to purpose, to 
public ethical purpose. 
Civil society emerged with vigor during the 1980s and 1990s, in 
Eastern Europe with the coming of Solidarity in Poland and ofVaclav 
Havel's movement in Czechoslovakia; and in South Africa with 
Mandela's movement, among others. Not surprisingly there has often 
been a churchly dimension in the mix. When these ethical movements 
come to public purpose, they develop and expand rapidly. The 
ensuing transformation to civil society spread to the West, including 
the US. No wonder neo-cons have now established NGOWatch. 110 
Neo-con internationalists are worried because global civil society 
will alter nation-state sovereignty.l 11 They are vexed because global 
civil society introduces an international deliberative ethos. They are 
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epistemologically resolute because global civil society subverts 
America's benevolent global hegemony. Neo-cons will not give up 
on The New American Century, on the Empire. 
Will the transformation of INGOs into global civil society bring 
with it an institutionalizing thrust toward an enduring and principled 
international rule of law? There are numerous complex questions 
beyond what we can investigate here. The nature of national 
sovereignty looms large. What kind of"civic internationalism" might 
emerge? Likely, some deliberative form of democracy will be in the 
international mix. That is, of course, if the world does not devolve 
into the new era of empire, being dreamed and it to be deliberated as 
publicly as possible. 
Notes 
In which ways both randomly and regularly will God 
rule the rulers? What future might God initiate 
through churchly engagement in global civil society? 
What ecclesial forms will serve this critical 
participation? How will Christians honour God in 
global civil society? 
Eusebius of Caesarea, The Ecclesiastical History (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1973); and In Praise of the Emperor 
Constantine, Pronounced on the Thirtieth Anniversmy of His Reign, in 
Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, eds. H Wace & P. Schaff (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1925), vol. 1, pp. 581-610. About a century 
later Augustine of Hippo would have to counter the charge made by 
pagans that, since the empire had Christian legitimacy and Christian 
rule, then Christianity was to blame for the fall of Rome to the Goths 
(see Augustine, City of God, in Fathers of the Church, ed. R. Deferrari 
[New York: Fathers ofthe Church, Inc., 1950-54], vols. 8, 14, 24). 
Throughout this essay I use the term "neo-con internationalists," or 
simply "neo-cons," to designate the architects of and/or activists for an 
implicit imperialism in expectation of explicit empire. "Neo-cons" is 
their self-identification, though recently some are shedding the term 
because it has taken on negative connotations in the public opinion. The 
movement of neo-con architects and activists has taken numerous 
institutional forms and formats . Among the most intellectually 
sophisticated - and they truly are!- are those who gather around Project 
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for the New American Centwy at www.newamericancentmy.org and 
American Enterprise Institute at www.aei.org. The fonner deals almost 
exclusively with international polity; until just recently the latter has 
weighted itself toward the domestic. Project for the New American 
Centl/1)1 set out its basic program in Robert Kagan and William Kristol, 
eds., Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and 
Defense Policy (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2000). It contains 
scholarly analyses by sixteen distinguished authors and continues to be 
the best single collection of neo-con internationalist thinking. 
For brief, reliable accounts see "Adiaphora and the Adiaphorist 
Controversies," by Clarence Beckwith, in The New Schaff-Herzog 
Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge, ed. Samuel Jackson (Grand 
Rapids, Michigan: 1949), vol. I, pp. 41-44; and "Adiaphora," by 
Timothy Wengert, in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Reformation, ed. 
Hans Hillerbrand (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), vol. I, 
pp. 4-7. 
The sixteenth-century controversy also had a public political context in 
which temporal government trespassed on specifically churchly, gospel 
matters, and churchly authorities, then, binding Christian freedom and 
consciences regarding things not divinely mandated. 
I have recently engaged both these topics. For the first see my "Toward 
a Lutheran 'Delight in the Law of the Lord': Church and State in the 
Context of Civil Society," in Church and State: Lutheran Perspectives, 
eds. John Stumme and Robert Tuttle (Minneapolis, Minnesota: Fortress 
Press, 2003), pp. 20-50. For the second see my '"Thou Shalt Not Kill' 
- The First Commandment of the Just War Tradition," in The Ten 
Commandments, ed. William Brown (Louisville, Kentucky: 
Westminster/John Knox, 2004). 
Robert Jenson's framing of the adiaphorist question has infonned my 
own; see "Sovereignty in the Church," in The New Church Debate: 
Issues Facing American Lutheranism, ed. Carl Braaten (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1983 ), p. 41. 
David Horowitz, "A cause that hurts America," Minneapolis Star 
Tribune, February 5, 2004. He edits Frontpage Magazine.com at 
www.frontpagemag.com and he chronicles his political conversion in 
Left Illusions: An Intellectual Odyssey (Spence Publishing, 2003). We 
can see the risk of an inquiry like ours by considering a statement by 
John Marburger III, Director of the White House Office of Science and 
Technology Policy. He uses the epithet, "conspiracy theory," to describe 
Scientific Integrity in Policymaking: An Investigation into the Bush 
Administrations Misuse of Science, Union of Concerned Scientists at 
www.ucsusa.or~/global enyironment/rsi/RSI final fullreport.pdf;(Emi 
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ly Johns reports Marburger's statement in "Scientists criticize White 
House," Minneapolis Star Tribune, February 19, 2004). The UCS 
research exposes "a well-established pattern of suppression and 
distortion ... [and] a wide-ranging effort to manipulate . .. [at a] scope 
and scale ... [that is] unprecedented." 
Abraham Lincoln, already as a US Representative, exquisitely rejected 
this confusion. His Gettysburg Address (November 19, 1863) is the 
source for "government of the people, by the people, for the people" at 
http://www.loc.gov/exhibjts/gadd/4403.html. See my "'By the Dawn's 
Early Light': The Flag, the Interrogative, and the Whence and Whither 
ofNormative Patriotism," Word & World23.3 (Summer 2003):274-278. 
The President's 2004 State of the Union Address is at 
www. whjtehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/0 I /print20040 I 20-7 .htm I; 
seep. 4. 
Reported by Mike Allen of The Washington Post in "Cheney seeks to 
reassure foreign critics," Minneapolis Star Tribune, January 25, 2004. 
"Imperialism," in The New Encyclopedia Britannica, ed. Philip Goetz 
(Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica Inc., 1987), vol. 6, p. 272. I use this 
classic and concise account of imperialism because it was written well 
over fifteen years ago and thus is not skewed by current events. 
See Reinhold Niebuhr, The Structure of Nations and Empires (New 
York: Charles Scribner's, 1959), especially pp. I 0-32. Niebuhr's 
anatomy of empire delineates the poles of prestige and power (pp. 8-9, 
66-88). 
The classic argument goes back to Aristotle's aristocratic notion of the 
benefactor polis; see Aristotle, Politics I, chap. 2, sec. IS . 
Thomas Donnelly and Vance Serchuk offer a contemporary neo-con 
analogy in "Toward a Global Cavalry: Overseas Rebasing and Defense 
Transformation," National Security Outlook, American Enterprise 
Institute, July I, 2003 at : 
www.aei.org/publications/pubiD.I77783.filter./pub detail.asp. 
David Brooks, neo-con Senior Editor, The Weekly Standard. pens an apt 
example. He intentionally confuses - literally, fuses - "American 
exceptionalism," which he legitimates morally, and "security," a natural 
right, commonly recognized. Brooks' apology for predatory 
exceptionalism - his own metaphor, "hawk," fits precisely! - gets 
smuggled under the guise of "security." Neo-cons say "security" 
explicitly and execute "exceptionalism" stealthily. See, David Brooks, 
"The Party of Kennedy, or Carter?" New York Times, February 17, 2004. 
For a helpful historical account of the theological apology for American 







Tuveson, Redeemer Nation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1968); and Martin Marty, Righteous Empire (New York: Harper & Row, 
1970); and). For classic US imperialist discourse that will "shock and 
awe" you because of its forthrightness - unlike today's neo-cons who 
cloak their imperialism - see US Senator Albert J. Beveridge, (Indiana 
1899-1911), "The March ofthe Flag," campaign speech September 16, 
1898 at www.fordham.edu/halsall/modll 898beveridge.html (this is the 
speech which made Beveridge famous; and "In Support of an American 
Empire," Congressional Record, 56tt' Congress, 1" session, pp. 704-712. 
(1900); and "The Star of Empire," September 25, 1900, in God's New 
Israel: Religious Inte1pretations of American Destiny, ed. Conrad 
Cherry (Chapel Hill, NC: University ofNorth Carolina Press, 1998), pp. 
146-159. In this last essay Beveridge argues that the moral , "benevolent 
colonial" rationale for empire surpasses by encompassing the imperial 
rationales of territory, economy, and human nature, these latter three all 
containing important truths, notes Beveridge. 
Niebuhr, Nations and Empires, p. 28. However one assesses Niebuhr 's 
Christian realism, reading his extensive critical analysis of empire is 
well worth the effort. What is particularly missing in the 1950s of 
Niebuhr's time is the emergent global civil society that we will describe 
in parts six and seven below and its critical contribution to any inquiry 
regarding empire. 
Paul Wolfowitz, "Statesmanship in the New Century," in Kagan and 
Kristol, Present Dangers, pp. 312, 314. Wolfowitz, as Assistant 
Secretary of Defense under the first President Bush, was third in 
command at the Pentagon, and now, as Deputy Secretary of Defense in 
President George W. Bush's administration, is second in command at 
the Pentagon. G. John Ikenberry, Peter F. Krogh Professor of 
Geopolitics and Global Justice at Georgetown University, has concisely 
and insightfully articulated seven elements that form the neo-con 
internationalist "new grand strategy" (see Ikenberry, "America's 
Imperial Ambition," Foreign Affairs 81.5 [Sept-Oct, 2002]: 44ff.). I 
base my exposition of neo-con internationalism on my reading of 
Kagan and Kristol, Present Dangers as well as other resources at 
Project for the New American Centwy, pp. 312-314. Ikenberry does not 
cite Present Dangers and he does not offer any footnoted references. 
Robert Kagan and William Kristol, "Introduction: National Interest and 
Global Responsibility," in Kagan and Kristol, Present Dangers; page 
numbers in my text refer to that essay. 
George Will, "Democrats are learning what doesn't work," Washington 
Post, Jan. 28, 2004. Will draws from Carnes Lord's - of the US Naval 
War College - analysis of the moribund feminization of politics coming 
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from a combination of numerous factors, including "the egalitarian, 
anti-hierarchical spirit of the age;" see Carnes Lord, The Modern 
Prince: What Leaders Need to Know Now (New Haven, CN, 2003). 
This is the theme of William J. Bennett's "Morality, Character and 
American Foreign Policy," in Kagan and Kristol, Present Dangers, pp. 
289-306; and of Donald Kagan's "Strength and Will: A Historical 
Perspective," in Kagan and Kristol, Present Dangers. pp. 337-362. 
George Will's recommendation to read Lord's The Modern Prince 
steers us to explore Niccolo Machiavelli's classic, The Prince. in order 
to get a better grasp of neo-con implicit imperialism. 
Kagan and Kristol, "Introduction," p. 24. In international political 
philosophy William Wohlforth, a noted "hegemonic theorist" developed 
the warrants for a unipolar world in "The Stability of a Unipolar World, 
International Security, 24.1 (Summer 1999): 5-41. Kagan and Kristol 
cite him favorably ("Introduction," p. 22). Thomas Donnelly, fonnerly 
Deputy Executive Director of Project for the New American Centlll)' 
and presently Resident Fellow at American Enterprise Institute, calls 
Wohlforth 's hegemonic theory "ground breaking" (see, Donnelly, 
"Brave New World: An Enduring Pax Americana," National Security 
Outlook, American Enterprise Institute, April I, 2003 at 
www.aei.ori/publications/pub!D.1671 0/pub detail. asp). 
James W. Caesar, "The Great Divide," in Kagan and Kristol, Present 
Dangers, pp. 27, 27, 23. Caesar sets out the comprehensive scope of the 
neo-cons' embryonic empire just beneath the veneer of implicit 
imperialism. 
The significant and complex question of the neo-con market economy 
lies beyond the scope ofthis essay. 
Wolfowitz, "Statesmanship in the New Century," p. 334. For the neo-
con critique of "idealist" internationalism see Kagan and Kristol, 
"Introduction," pp. 22-24, 28-32, 
Wolfowitz, "Statesmanship in the New Century," p. 334. 
See Plutarch, "To an Uneducated Ruler," in Mora/ia, vol. 10, par. 780, 
trans. H. Fowler, in Loeb Classic LibraiJ' (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1960). 
John Adams inscribed this criterion in the opening clause of the original 
draft of the Massachusetts' Constitution ( 1779). 
Plutarch's stunning imperialist argument is: 
But if he [the real statesman] were given the choice among 
governments [monarchy, aristocracy, democracy], like so many 
tools, he would follow Plato's advice and choose no other than 










monarchy, the only one which is able to sustain that top note of 
viltue, high in the highest sense, and never let it be tuned down 
under compulsion or expediency. For the other forms of 
government in a certain sense, although controlled by the 
statesman, control him, and although carried along by him, carry 
him along, since he has no finnly established strength to oppose 
those from whom his strength is derived, but is often compelled to 
exclaim in the words of Aeschylus which Demetrius the City-
stonner employed against Fortune after he had lost his hegemony, 
"Thou fanst my flame, I methinks thou bumst me up." 
See "On Monarch, Democracy, and Oligarchy," in Moralia, op. cit., par. 
827. Plutarch believes that the contingencies of Fortune, which spark 
the desire for Fame, always threaten death - "bumst me up" - and this 
belief leads Plutarch to pursue superior "control." 
Wolfowitz, "Statesmanship in the New Century," p. 334. 
Ibid., p. 334-5. 
Ibid., p. 335. 
Joseph Cirincione, Jessica T. Mathews, and George Perkovich 
investigate the systemic deception that has been perpetrated regarding 
the weapons of mass destruction justification for the 2003-03 Iraq War 
in WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications (Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 2004) at: 
www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/irar;Jintell/home.htm. 
Caesar, "The Great Divide," p. 41. Quotations in this paragraph come 
from p. 41. 
Max Boot, "Doctrine of the 'Big Enchilada,"' The Washington Post, 
October 14, 2004 at www.newamerjcanceotucy.or~/irag-1 0 1402.htm. 
Accounts of this incident are legion. Neo-con accounts are particularly 
revealing. 
Wohlfarth gives this account of neo-con linguistic discipline in 
"Unipolar World," op. cit. 
Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 
Inc., 1952), chap. 18, p. 25. In chapter fifteen he had already offered this 
foretaste : "Hence it is necessary for a prince wishing to hold his own 
[remain in power] to know how to do wrong [to act immorally], and to 
make use of it or not according to necessity" (chap. 15, p. 22). See 
Quentin Skinner's exposition of Machiavelli's rejection of classic 
humanist as well as Christian virtue traditions in Machiavelli, pp. 38-53. 
Quentin Skinner, Machiavelli: A Ve1y Short Introduction (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2000) p. I. 
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The Discourses (New York: Modern Library, 1940), p. xxxiv. 
Ibid., p. xxxiv. Lerner rightly places the ethical opposite the ruthless, 
but the ethical need not be the polar opposite of realism. 
See Skinner's exposition of Machiavelli's critical overturning of 
Western public ethics, classical humanist and Christian (Machiavelli, 
pp. 23-53). In part 2 above I complied with the standard account and 
grouped Machiavelli with the second modern justification for empire. 
He actually fits within the fourth "moral" rationale. Machiavelli 
addressed quite a different treatise to the ruled than he did to the rulers; 
see Leo Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli (Glencoe, lllinois: Free Press, 
1958). pp. 15-53. 
Usually people regard Jean-Jacques Rousseau as the father of modem 
aristocratic, republican democracy and for good reason. Still, his 
predecessor is Machiavelli, whose more republican treatise is 
Discourses on the First Ten Books of Livy. For the relation between 
Machiavelli and political republicanism see Strauss, op.cit, pp. 9-53; 
and see Skinner (op. cit., pp. 3-7). Notoriously, Rousseau's proposal is 
"an exceedingly complicated puzzle," which from the beginning 
produced different even contradictory polities; see Wilhnoore Kendall, 
"Introduction," in The Social Contract (Chicago: Henry Regency Co, 
1954), pp. vii-xiii. Rousseau provided an aristocratic moral rationale for 
a constitutional republic fonn of democracy. In US history James 
Madison saw the dilemma but could resolve it satisfactorily; see Ronald 
Thiemann, Religion in Public Life: A Dilemma for Democracy 
(Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1996), pp. 19-33. 
Caesar, "The Great Divide," p. 40. 
Ibid. Wohlfarth's bases "unipolarization" on ordered stability; see 
"Unipolar World," pp. 5-41. 
Wohlfmth (op. cit.) uses both the logic of "can means ought" and the 
logic that "order" is the form of justice that results in peace. The 
"unambiguously unipolar" world is, therefore, inevitably and durably 
"prone to peace." Peace is the byproduct of a "decisive preponderance 
in all the underlying components of power: economic, military, 
technological, and geopolitical." These are the four "deeply embedded 
material condition[s]" that make peace real. "Hence both the overall 
size and the comprehensiveness of the leader's power advantage are 
crucial to peacefulness. If the system is unipolar, the great power 
hierarchy should be much more stable than a system of more than one 
pole." In hegemonic theory this is called full-spectrum dominance. Just 
call it "empire"! 







Niebuhr, Nations and Empires. p. 4. A penetrating and exhaustive 
analysis of this phenomenon and its history of effects in Western social 
and political theory is Alvin W. Gouldner, Enter Plato: Classical Greece 
and the Origins of Social The01y (New York: Harper & Row, 1965). 
Gouldner extends this analysis to include twentieth-century systems 
theory in The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology (New York: Basic 
Books, 1970). Wolfarth's analysis of order, stability, and durability has 
deep roots in the assumptions of a dominant fonn of systems theory. 
Galatians 6:7. Ikenberry, Foreign Affairs 81.5, shows why neo-con 
internationalist imperialism cannot be sustained. 
Donald Kagan makes the neo-con case for "resolve"; see "Strength and 
Will: A Historical Perspective," in Kagan and Kristol, Present Dangers, 
pp. 337-362. 
Ibid., p. 350. 
Machiavelli, The Prince, chap. xxv, p. 35. For Machiavelli's virtue of 
"resolve" see Skinner, Machiavelli, pp. 28-35, 38-42. 
Machiavelli, The Prince, chap. xxv, p. 35 . 
President Bush's February 8, 2004 interview on NBC's Meet the Press 
with Tim Russert is a good example of the overall ethos of 
epistemological resolve; see the transcript at 
http: //msnbc.msn.com/jd/4179618/. Russert: "Mr. President, the 
Director of the CIA said that his briefings had qualifiers and caveats, but 
when you spoke to the country, you said, 'there is no doubt.' When Vice 
President Cheney spoke to the country, he said, ' there is no doubt. ' 
Secretary Powell, 'no doubt.' Secretary Rumsfeld, ' no doubt, we know 
where the weapons are.' You said, quote, 'The Iraqi regime is a threat of 
unique urgency. ' 'Saddam Hussein is a threat that we must deal with as 
quickly as possible.' You gave the clear sense that this was an 
immediate threat that must be dealt with." President Bush: "I think, if I 
might remind you that in my language I called it a grave and gathering 
threat, but I don' t want to get into word contests. But what I do want to 
share with you is my sentiment at the time. There was no doubt in my 
mind Saddam Hussein was a danger to America. No doubt." 
Caesar, "The Great Divide," p. 43. 
Recall the subtitle of Present Dangers - Crisis and Opportunity in 
American Foreign Policy and Defense Policy. 
1992 is the year that Wolfowitz produced his Pentagon memo that got 
roundly criticized; see Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why 
New Great Powers Will Arise," International Security 17.4 (Spring 
1993):5-51. 
http://scholars.wlu.ca/consensus/vol29/iss2/2










Donnelly identifies these three periods; see "The Proof of Primacy," 
National Security Outlook (February 2004): www.aei.org. Donnelly's 
National Security Outlook represents a more internationalist agenda for 
AEI. 
See Gary Schmitt and Tom Donnelly, "The Bush Doctrine," at 
www.newamericancentury.org/defense-20020 130.htm. Donnelly's 
more extensive analysis of "the Bush doctrine" is "The Underpinnings 
of the Bush Doctrine," National Security Outlook, February I, 2003 at 
www.aei.org/publications/pubiD.I5845/pub detail.asp. 
William Kristol, "Taking the War Beyond Terrorism," The Washington 
Post, January 31, 2002 at www.newamericancentury.org/defense-
20020131.htm; and William Kristol, "President's Speech on the Middle 
East," at www.newamericancentury.org/bushspeech-062502.htm. 
Kristol, "Taking the War Beyond Terrorism." 
Kristol, "Taking the War Beyond Terrorism." 
Kristol, "Taking the War Beyond Terrorism." 
Robert Kagan, "Powell's Moment," The Washington Post, February I 0, 
2002 at www.newamericancentury.org/defense-2002021 O.htm. 
Kristol, "Taking the War Beyond Terrorism." 
Boot, "Doctrine of the 'Big Enchilada,"' The National Security Strategy 
of the United States of America is at www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html. 
Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli, pp. 61-63 . 
Boot, "Doctrine of the 'Big Enchilada,"' 
See William Kristol, eta/., "Dear Mr. President," January 23, 2003 at 
www.newamericancentury.org/defense-20030123 .htm, a letter signed 
by twenty-seven prominent neo-cons. 
Donnelly, "The Underpinnings of the Bush Doctrine." 
Boot, "Doctrine ofthe 'Big Enchilada,"' 
Simpson, '"By the Dawn's Early Light."' 
See Kristol, eta!., "Dear Mr. President." 
Machiavelli, The Prince. Because William Bennett, Mr. Virtue (The 
Book of Virtues [New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993]), writes the 
"character" chapter in Present Dangers with an onslaught on President 
Clinton, he would be an excellent case study for secrecy, given his now 
outed gambling habit, secreted for years even from his wife. Still, in a 
paraphrase, secrecy is the compliment that vice pays to virtue. "0, 
Almighty God, to whom all hearts are open, all desires known, and from 
whom no secrets are hid, cleanse the thoughts of our hearts by the 







For the full text of Lazarus' famous poem, for an excellent resource 
about her life, for a brief, critical analysis of her poetic contribution to 
American public life, and for a helpful bibliography see 
http://www.jwa.org/exhjbjts/lazarus/. 
See the stunning investigation by renowned Republican political 
analyst, Kevin Phillips (American Dynasty: Aristocracy, Fortune, and 
the Problem of Deceit in the House of Bush (New York: Viking Penguin, 
2004). Four chief components have over time established the Bush 
dynasty: financial cronyism, manipulation of energy markets, cozy 
connections with the bounty of the military-industrial complex, and the 
secret ties within the national security and intelligence community. 
Democratic expectations make cloaking necessary. Machiavelli did not 
have such democratic "hardships." Luther insightfully and decisively 
notes how "cloaking" violates the Second Commandment's prohibition 
of blasphemy, and he theologically bases his own critical theory in the 
Second Commandment (see Luther, The Large Catechism in The Book 
of Concord: The Confessions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, eds. 
Robert Kolb and Timothy Wengert [Minneapolis, Minnesota: Fortress 
Press, 2000], pp. 392-396). 
W.E.B. DuBois, The Souls of Black Folks, ed. Herbe1t Aptheker 
(Mil wood, New York: Kraus-Thomson, 1973). DuBois noted that this 
double consciousness, the one of slave culture and the other of master 
culture, gave blacks a double dose of cultural knowledge and thus an 
emancipatory epistemological advantage. Worth considering is whether 
Bush enjoys a reverse, imperialist epistemological advantage. 
For the neo-con claim to have "created" the Iraq War see Donnelly, 
"Brave New World." "A US victory [in the Iraq War] . . . will define the 
start of a truly new world order; to steal Dean Acheson's famous phrase, 
we are present at the creation." Also see Robert Kagan, 
"Multilateralism, American Style," The Washington Pos, September 13, 
2002 at www.newamerjcanceotury.or!V~Iobal-091302.htm; Kagan calls 
the War "an American-created reality on Iraq," actually a neo-con 
created War. 
Kristol, "Taking the War Beyond Terrorism." For the Iraq War invention 
during the neo-con preparation period see Richard Perle, "Iraq: Saddam 
Unbound," in Kagan and Kristol, Present Dangers, pp. 107-108. 
Colin Powell, "Remarks to the United Nations Security Council," at 
www.state.~oy/secretary/rm/2003/J 7300.htm. Note in his statement the 
neo-con discourse of"present dangers." Secretary Powell had forty-five 
slides with his address. He used nine specially designed slides that 
emphasized his epistemological resolve. Each of these nine featured an 
ominous grey-black background. Each said, "IRAQ - Failing To 
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Disann - ." At his "gravity of this moment" statement he featured 
"IRAQ - Failing To Disann - Biological Weapons." As his speech 
continued he piled on the certainty with "IRAQ- Failing To Disann -
Chemical Weapons," then "IRAQ - Failing To Disann - Nuclear 
Weapons," then "IRAQ - Failing To Disann- Delivery Systems," then 
"IRAQ - Failing To Disann - Terrorism," then "IRAQ - Failing To 
Disann - Human Rights Violations." Everyone knows that the last 
certainty-slide is true; everyone also now knows that the "certainties" of 
the previous five lie along a spectrum from disinformation to 
misinfonnation. 
These officials include Vice President Dick Cheney on August 29, 2002 
to veterans of the Korean War in San Antonio, TX; the President on 
September 12, 2002 at the United Nations; Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld on September 18, 2002 before the US House of 
Representatives Armed Services Committee and on September 19, 2002 
before the US Senate Armed Services Committee. You can find all of 
these speeches at either the Associated Press site 
www.newslibrm:y.com/sites/apab/ or 
http:/ /n I. newsban k.com/nl.search/we/ Archives? 
George F. Will, "To win, Bush will have to tell it like it is," Washington 
Post, February 8, 2004. David Kay, President Bush's Iraq arms 
inspector, resigned from his post in January 2004 and was interviewed 
by Liane Hansen on National Public Radios Weekend Edition. Since 
then the world knows that Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction 
have been missing in action for many years. Likely, Will's sudden case 
of conscience has arisen due to the imminent threat of an election. 
See Jonathan Snow, "The Case for War in Iraq," February 3, 2004 at 
http:/ /www.defenddemocracy.org/pub I icati ons/pub I ications show.htm? 
doc id=205195; Snow is Manager, Research and Messaging, The 
Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. Employing rhetorical 
discipline Snow quibbles about words denying that the Bush 
administration ever used the tenn "imminent threat" when justifying the 
Iraq War. It undoubtedly and abundantly used many publicly equivalent 
phrases. Futther, in his 2003 State of the Union Address the President 
did in fact point to Iraq as an "imminent threat" by mocking those who 
"have said we must not act until the threat is imminent" (at 
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/0 1120030 128-19.htm. It is 
likely that the President had actually jettisoned the "imminent threat" 
portion of the "just cause" criterion of the just war tradition, at least in 
his own thinking; and that he had substituted a neo-con war realist and 
imperial rationale that advances "a wider view of the traditional 
doctrine of 'imminent danger."' Neo-cons, at least, say this about the 








President; see Donnelly, "Underpinnings of the Bush Doctrine." The 
President's strategic abandonment of this traditional just war criterion, 
even as he professes fighting "in a just cause and by just means," leads 
to his imperialist preemption doctrine. 
Clifford D. May, "The Imperfect Stonn: Anti-war Warriors Cloud Recent 
History," Scripps Howard News Service, January 15, 2004 at 
www.defenddemocracy.org/jn the media/in the media show.htm?do 
c jd=203139; May is President, The Foundation for the Defense of 
Democracies. President Bush included at least four of these reasons in 
his January 20, 2004 State of the Union Address. 
George Will's Johnny-come-lately advise surely fits the case here: "Once 
begun, leakage of public confidence in a president's pronouncements is 
difficult to staunch;" see Will, "To win, Bush will have to tell it like it is." 
See, for instance, Thomas Donnelly's analysis in "Iraq Is the Central 
Front," National Security Outlook, American Enterprise Institute, 
(October 2003). Donnelly notes, 'The most forceful argument against 
the [Bush] doctrine is that it is too audacious, too costly for America to 
accept - even after the attacks of September II supposedly woke us 
from a decade's slumber." "Too audacious" is neo-con linguistic 
discipline. "Too audacious" really means too imperialist. Neo-cons 
know that they are most vulnerable in the court of US and international 
public opi.nion when the imperialist charge is made to stick. Neo-cons 
orient their linguistic discipline to combat the charge of imperialism. 
For this reason discerning implicit imperialism is crucial! 
President Bush, State of the Union Address, 2004, op. cit. 
William Satire, "Clearly, we're reversing march of terror," New York 
Times, January 12, 2004. Beyond Libya, Satire's progressively 
ascending slippery slope includes Afghanistan, Syria, the Palestinian 
West Bank, Iran, and North Korea. 
See Gary M. Simpson, Critical Social Themy: Prophetic Reason, Civil 
Society, and Christian Imagination (Minneapolis, Minnesota: Fortress 
Press, 2002), pp. 27-52. 
Donnelly, "Brave New World." 
Thomas Friedman, "What really was gross about halftime show," New 
York Times, February 9, 2004. The following paragraphs in the main 
text refer to this editorial. 
Robert Kagan, "Multilateralism, American Style." The quotations in 
this paragraph and the next two are from Kagan. Caesar also soundly 
rejects principled multilateralism and favors an expedient 
internationalism; see Caesar, "The Great Divide," p. 41. 
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Russe1t's February 8, 2004 interview with President Bush, op. cit . 
See Martin Luther, "Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved," (American 
Edition of Luther s Works [St. Louis and Philadelphia, 1955-1986] 
[hereafter LW]), Vol. 46. 
Wolfowitz, "Statesmanship in the New Century," p. 309. 
This stands at the heart of "Honour your father and your mother" as 
Christians throughout the ages have taught. Luther is a good example 
among a host of possible examples in this regard. He finds key aspects 
of his doctrine of vocation in the "fourth" commandment, especially in 
regard to "honour;" see Simpson, "Lutheran 'Delight,"' pp. 26-29. 
See Simpson, "Lutheran 'Delight,"' pp. 37-44. 
Martin Luther, "Commentary on Psalm 101," (1534) LW, Vol. 13, pp. 
154-175. Luther, referring to Aristotle, imagines these extraordinary 
leaders as a kind of non-hereditary, free-floating, ad hoc aristocracy 
(LW; Vol. 13, pp. 161 ). Shortly after the failure of the 1530 Diet of 
Augsburg to bring peace within the empire, Luther readies the German 
people for just such a "raising up" by God. Increasingly, he invokes the 
figure of Judas Maccabeus; see Luther, "Dr. Mmtin Luther's Warning to 
His Dear German People" ( 1531) LW, Vol. 47, p. 17. 
Martin Luther, "Commentary on Psalm 82," (LW, Vol. 13, pp. 49-51 ). 
This is often called "Luther's Treatise on the Christian Prince." In "A 
Sermon on Keeping Children in School" (1530) Luther again extols the 
role that the office of preaching plays vis-a-vis political authority (LW, 
Vol. 46, pp. 226-227). Significantly, he argues that preachers should 
exercise the admonitory obligation of their office a fully public and 
open forum (LW, Vol. 47, pp. 21-29). 
Martin Luther, "On War against the Turk" ( 1529) LW. Vol. 46, pp. 170. 
Martin Luther, The Large Catechism, p. 419; also see Martin Luther, 
"Admonition to Peace," ( 1525) LT¥, Vol. 46, pp. 32, 41. 
Martin Luther, "Temporal Authority: To What Extent It Should Be 
Obeyed," (1523) LW, Vol. 45, pp. 116. 
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Lincoln, "Gettysburg Address." 
Historically, US aristocrats embedded their economic reduction of 
"Give me your tired, your poor," in a two-tiered educational system. 
The aristocrats get education in the humanities and the "huddled 
masses" get technological training, pedagogical equivalent of"let them 
eat cake." See "Education: Technical and Moral," in Robert Bellah, et 
a/., The Good Society (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991 ), pp. 145-178. 
"The voice ofthe people is the voice of God." The Latin phrase appears 
in striking gold leaf on the sky blue wall of the legislative chambers of 
the State Capitol in St. Paul, MN. This is Ciceronian common place in 
Western political discourse. It likely appeared in one of the numerous 
missing sections Cicero's The Republic. A famous rejection of it was 
issued by Alcuin in the year 800 A.D. Alcuin was Emperor 
Charlemagne's court theologian and imperial apologist. Monarchists 
discern God's voice in the well born, aristocrats in the well bred, and 
imperialists in the coercively empowered. 
Lincoln, Gettysburg Address. 
See John Keane, Global Civil Society? (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003). There is an explosion of research in global civil 
society and related phenomena. Keane provides an extensive 
bibliography. 
"" NGOWatch is "A project of The American Enterprise Institute and the 
Federalist Society, at www.ngowatch.org. NGOWatch is quite careful 
how it articulates its purpose. While clearly worried and suspicious, it 
projects - or is it feigns? - respect. It is particularly interested in the 
effect that INGOs have on "sovereignty." Sovereignty touches, of 
course, the question of the international rule of law. See 
"http://www.ngowatch.org/treaties.htm#Sov" 
Ill See Elaine L. Chao, "Address to The Federalist Society," November 14, 
2003 at "http://www.ngowatch.org/ChaoAddress.pdf. U.s'' Chao, US 
Secretary of Labor, recognizes the significance ofNGOs and INGOs for 
the future of nation-state sovereignty and is exceedingly anxious about 
this. From this address I can make no judgment either whether she 
considers herself a neo-con internationalist or whether she could 
legitimately be placed ideationally among them. 
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